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GENERATING REMBRANDT: ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE, COPYRIGHT, AND
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE 3A ERA—THE
HUMAN-LIKE AUTHORS ARE ALREADY
HERE—A NEW MODEL
Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid *
2017 VISIONARY ARTICLE IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW
2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 659
ABSTRACT
Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are creative, unpredictable,
independent, autonomous, rational, evolving, capable of data
collection, communicative, efficient, accurate, and have free choice
among alternatives. Similar to humans, AI systems can
autonomously create and generate creative works. The use of AI
systems in the production of works, either for personal or
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manufacturing purposes, has become common in the 3A era of
automated, autonomous, and advanced technology. Despite this
progress, there is a deep and common concern in modern society
that AI technology will become uncontrollable. There is therefore a
call for social and legal tools for controlling AI systems’ functions
and outcomes.
This Article addresses the questions of the copyrightability of
artworks generated by AI systems: ownership and accountability.
The Article debates who should enjoy the benefits of copyright
protection and who should be responsible for the infringement of
rights and damages caused by AI systems that independently produce
creative works. Subsequently, this Article presents the AI MultiPlayer paradigm, arguing against the imposition of these rights and
responsibilities on the AI systems themselves or on the different
stakeholders, mainly the programmers who develop such systems.
Most importantly, this Article proposes the adoption of a new
model of accountability for works generated by AI systems: the AI
Work Made for Hire (WMFH) model, which views the AI system as a
creative employee or independent contractor of the user. Under this
proposed model, ownership, control, and responsibility would be
imposed on the humans or legal entities that use AI systems and
enjoy its benefits. This model accurately reflects the human-like
features of AI systems; it is justified by the theories behind copyright
protection; and it serves as a practical solution to assuage the fears
behind AI systems. In addition, this model unveils the powers behind
the operation of AI systems; hence, it efficiently imposes
accountability on clearly identifiable persons or legal entities. Since
AI systems are copyrightable algorithms, this Article reflects on the
accountability for AI systems in other legal regimes, such as tort or
criminal law and in various industries using these systems.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 661
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the Human(s) Behind the Machine.................................. 689
1. Who Could the Owner Be? ....................................... 691
2. Distinguishing Between the Rights over
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Works Produced by Automated AI Systems; and
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INTRODUCTION
The artist appraises the work, silently judging each stroke of
dark ink on the canvas. Determining that the composition is not
shaded quite right, the artist decides to switch to an even blacker hue.
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Retrieving the brush from the palette, the artist begins to work again,
methodically filling the canvas with terse, precise brushstrokes. This
is a familiar scene, one that has been playing out in artists’
workshops from the medieval classic painters to modern creative
artists. This artist, however, is different. It is a robot. Named e-David
by its creators at the University of Konstanz in Germany, this robotic
artist uses a complex visual optimization algorithm to create
paintings.1 E-David represents merely one step in the ongoing
development of the complex, advanced, automated, autonomous,
unpredictable, and evolving artificial intelligence (AI) systems that
already create original intellectual property works. 2
These AI systems are quite different from simple laser printers,
which can only reproduce or copy existing works, in a predictable,
structural method. E-David, on the other hand, unlike the traditional
systems, can produce new drawings in a non-anticipated and creative
way. 3 E-David does not copy other works, but instead autonomously
takes pictures with its camera and draws original paintings from
these photographs. Some of these artworks might be entitled to
1. See Oliver Deussen et al., Feedback-Guide Stroke Placement for a
Painting Machine, in P ROC . EIGHTH ANN. S YMP. ON COMPUTATIONAL AESTHETICS
IN GRAPHICS, VISUALIZATION & IMAGING 25, 25, 27 (2012) (describing the eDavid painting machine, designed to simulate human painting processes, and
the methods used by the developers in the Department of Computer and
Information Science at the University of Konstanz, Germany). E-David has an
arm, five brushes, a camera, a system of optimization via visual feedback, and
a system of optimization strategy. See id.; see also Jason Falconer, e-David the
Robot Painter Excels in Numerous Styles, N EW ATLAS (July 17, 2013),
http://newatlas.com/edavid-robot-artist-painter/28310/ [http://perma.cc/R6DR44EM] (arguing that “[t]he line between art and technology isn’t just being
blurred, it’s being erased altogether”).
2. Falconer, supra note 1 (describing the artworks of e-David as
composed of sketches from existing pictures as well as new ones taken with a
camera). Relying on existing works might be considered an infringement of the
copyright of the original works either directly or as creating derivative works.
However, more sophisticated AI systems can create new artworks without
copying or infringing copyrights of others. These systems are the focus of this
Article. See, e.g., Harold Cohen, Driving the Creative Machine, ORCAS C TR .,
CROSSROADS LECTURE S ERIES, 1, 3, 5, 7 (Sept. 2010), www.aaronshome.com/
aaron/aaron/publications/orcastalk2s.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ATBALJP] (describing the AARON machine, which is another machine that creates
abstract artworks); see also Harold Cohen, Fingerpainting for the 21st
Century, AARON S HOME (Feb. 8, 2016), aaronshome.com/aaron/aaron/
publications/8Feb2016Fingerpainting-for-the-21st-Century-with-Figures.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A2J4-PVSK] (explaining the techniques and the process of
developing the system).
3. See Falconer, supra note 1.
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copyright protection had humans created them. By using different
techniques and an optimization system, e-David makes autonomous
and unpredictable decisions about the image it is creating, the shapes
and colors, the best way to combine light and shadow, and more. 4
Even though e-David functions through software created by its
programmers, a camera embedded in its complex system allows it to
independently take new pictures and generate new creative input as
“its own.”
In this Article, I argue that under the “3A era” of automated,
autonomous, and advanced technology, sophisticated AI systems and
robots turn into talented authors. Indeed, these AI systems already
function in the 3A era, generate products and services, make
decisions, act, and independently create artworks.
In 2016, nearly 400 years after the death of Rembrandt
Harmenszoon van Rijn, the famous Dutch painter, a new Rembrandt,
or rather The Next Rembrandt, was unveiled to the world. 5 The goal
of the project was to digitize the painting method of Rembrandt, the
human painter. 6 Once the program “learned” the style of the painter,
it would create a new, creative, independent, and original work of art
of the genuine Rembrandt. 7 To ensure its success, the project brought
together experts from a variety of fields—engineering, history, art—

4. Id. (describing how the software chooses what paint color and
brush strokes are needed and how it can make up for inaccuracies in brush
strokes and unpredictable paint mixing that occurs on the canvas).
5. Steve Schlackman, The Next Rembrandt: Who Holds the Copyright in
Computer Generated Art, ART L.J. (Apr. 22, 2016), http://artlawjournal.com/thenext-rembrandt-who-holds-the-copyright-in-computer-generated-art
[https://perma.cc/2C2R-EB5N] (discussing how the first “goal of the project was to
discover if an algorithm could . . . produce a physical work of art that would mimic
the look of a genuine Rembrandt painting”).
6. Id.
7. Id.; see also The Next Rembrandt, YOUTUBE (Apr. 5, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IuygOYZ1Ngo&t=3s [https://perma.cc/
L4PR-NZNC].
To accomplish this lofty task, the team began with an in-depth
study of the proportions and features of the faces in Rembrandt’s
works. To master his style, the project team “designed a software
system that could understand Rembrandt based on his use of
geometry, composition, and painting materials. A facial recognition
algorithm identified and classified the most typical geometric patterns
used by Rembrandt to paint human features. It then used the learned
principles to replicate the style and generate new facial features for
our painting.”
Schlackman, supra note 5.
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and transferred their knowledge into software capable of creating
entirely new works of art. 8
Once a work such as the new Rembrandt painting is created by
an AI system, however, policy makers must re-consider the
relevancy of the current laws. Can our legal system cope with
questions of ownership and responsibility in the 3A era that have
never been seen before? 9 This discussion has deep roots in the
copyright regime because AI systems are, ultimately, software
algorithms that are regulated under the existing copyright law
regime. 10 I argue that one of the main challenges in the near future,
the accountability of AI systems, may be solved through the use of
copyright lens. 11
AI systems and machine learning have already become part of
our everyday life. One can already identify AI systems in unexpected
regimes, such as: AI doctors, 12 AI therapists, 13 independent driverless

8. See The Next Rembrandt, supra note 7.
9. HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 3-35 (2011)
(describing how the ownership of property rights means not only excluding others
but also having accountability toward others regarding the right over the property
and the use of the property); see also HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN
LEGAL REALISM & RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW THEORY 104-28, 161-92 (2013)
(disagreeing with the prevailing approach of private law in general and interprets the
private law as reflecting horizontal relationships among citizens); Hanoch Dagan,
The Challenges of Private Law: A Research Agenda for an Autonomy-Based Private
Law, in PRIVATE LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 67-87 (Kit Barker, Karen Fairweather
& Ross Grantham eds., 2017) (advocating for private law as necessary to govern
interpersonal relationships).
10. See Copyright Ownership: Who Owns What?, STAN. U. LIBR.,
https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/faqs/copyright-ownership/
[https://perma.cc/4Y6E-ASJK] (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
11. See, e.g., Rebecca Crootof, War Torts: Accountability for Autonomous
Weapons, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1347, 1366, 1375-86 (2016) (arguing that because
autonomous weapons can independently and unpredictably select and engage
targets—causing mass killings and damage—and because there is no individual to
blame for reckless behavior, a new legal regime of tort laws should arise in the
absence of other existing international tools); see also GABRIEL HALLEVY, WHEN
ROBOTS KILL: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE UNDER CRIMINAL LAW 1-4 (2013)
(discussing the accountability of robots for criminal offenses).
12. Jolene Creighton, AI Saves Woman’s Life by Identifying Her Disease
When Other Methods (Human) Failed, FUTURISM (Aug. 5, 2016),
http://futurism.com/ai-saves-womans-life-by-identifying-her-disease-when-othermethods-humans-failed [https://perma.cc/8SWR-U9TD] (“If you needed proof that
the age of artificial intelligence is officially upon us, well, look no farther. Reports
assert [] that IBM’s artificial intelligence (AI) system, Watson, just saved the life of
a Japanese woman by correctly identifying her disease. This is notable because, for
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cars, 14 AI lawyers, 15 automated Alternative Dispute Resolution,16 and
automated contracts. 17 AI systems have also significantly influenced
many other fields, such as investments, 18 automated weapons,19
some time, her illness went undetected using conventional methods, and doctors
were stumped.”).
13. See Jonathan Amos, Love Lab Predicts Marital Outcome, BBC
NEWS (Feb. 13, 2004, 9:20 AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/
3484981.stm [https://perma.cc/ZFU7-Y69K] (discussing a mathematical model
scientists believe can tell which marriages are doomed to end in divorce).
14. See David Szondy, University of Oxford Develops Low-Cost Self
Driving Car System, NEW ATLAS (Feb. 18, 2013), http://newatlas.com/oxford-robotcar/26282 [https://perma.cc/BU7S-6RGY]; see also Alexandru Budisteanu, Using
Artificial Intelligence to Create a Low Cost Self-driving Car, BUDISTEANU,
http://budisteanu.net/Download/ISEF%202%20Autonomous%20car%20Doc%20par
ticle.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y46J-KSSA] (last visited Jan. 15, 2018) (discussing how
a car that should be able to drive automatically and autonomously in an urban area is
achievable). In 2004 road traffic caused 2.5 million deaths worldwide and 50 million
injuries—87% of crashes were due solely to driver factors. Id. Most of the project’s
components of self-driving cars have been done; the system is able to recognize the
traffic signs and register them in a common database using Google maps, GPS, and
more. Id.
15. See, e.g., Jessica Chasmar, Stanford Student’s Robot Lawyer Has
Beaten 160,000 Parking Tickets, WASH. TIMES (June 29, 2016),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/29/joshua-browder-stanfordstudents-robot-lawyer-has-/ [https://perma.cc/X9CE-VESH] (describing a lawyer
bot that won 160,000 cases); This Robot Lawyer Could Help You Get Your Parking
Ticket Dismissed, CBS NEWS (July 21, 2016, 7:05 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/
news/donotpay-bot-lawyer-helps-dismiss-parking-tickets-joshua-browder [https://
perma.cc/7REW-JWHC] (describing Stanford University freshman Joshua Browder
and how the robot already saved drivers an estimated $4-5 million).
16. Chasmar, supra note 15.
17. Lauren Henry Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, 20 STAN. TECH L. REV.
128, 133 (2017) (arguing that “[t]he existence of algorithms that must be understood
as servants rather than mere tools justifies the creation and analysis of a distinct
category called ‘algorithmic contracts,’” and that “[m]achine learning enables
sophisticated algorithms to be more similar in function to a human employee with a
task to achieve than a tool”).
18. Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lexv-Aretz, Big Data and Social
Netbanks: Are You Ready To Replace Your Bank?, 53 H OUS. L. R EV. 1211,
1222 (2016) (showing that most financial institutes in North America are using
big data analyses and banks are moving toward adopting technologies tools).
19. Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy
Implications, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837, 1840-43, 1863-71, 1894-1901 (2015)
(arguing that AI weapons “systems with varying levels of autonomy . . . have
already integrated into the armed forces of numerous states” and calling for defining
Autonomous Weapon System and regulating them internationally); see also Roberto
Baldwin, The Robots of War: AI and the Future of Combat, ENGADGET (Aug. 18,
2016), https://www.engadget.com/2016/08/18/robots-of-war-ai-and-the-future-ofcombat [https://perma.cc/NPZ2-66VV] (arguing that “[t]he future of warfare will be
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espionage, 20 and even social policymaking. 21 It is hard to imagine an
area of study that has not been influenced by AI systems.
The AI industry has rapidly and consistently become an
inevitable part of our present, and it is expected to further develop as
the industry is estimated to grow to $70 billion by 2020. 22 Although
these systems are set to add substantial value to our world and bring
about positive change, there are several drawbacks to these advanced
filled with AI and robots [and] it’ll be a world where whoever builds the best
artificial intelligent will emerge the victor”); Caitlin Brock, Where We’re Going, We
Don’t Need Drivers: The Legal Issues and Liability Implications of Automated
Vehicle Technology, 83 UMKC L. REV. 769, 770-73, 787-88 (2015) (arguing that
the future of no driver reality is coming and the time to prepare is now); Ray
Kurzweil, The Virtual Thomas Edison, TIME (Dec. 4, 2000),
http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,90538-2,00.html [https://
perma.cc/NK3R-29E8] (discussing issues raised by automated machines and the
future of robots).
20. Jasper Hamill, Eyes in The Sky: CIA Training Artificial Intelligence
to Spy on Earth from Space Using Computer Vision, THE SUN (Aug. 25, 2016,
5:19
PM),
https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/1673802/cia-training-artificialintelligence-to-spy-on-earth-from-space-using-computer-vision
[https://perma.cc/4Q67-4AWW].
21. Rob Kling, Automated Information Systems as Social Resources in
Policy Making, ACM 666, 666 (1978), http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=810109
[https://perma.cc/C8HL-PTBS]. Automated information systems have been
suggested by a number of theorists to aid public policy makers in acquiring
more accurate, timely, and relevant information.
This paper reports a study of the uses and impacts of automated
systems for policy analysis in 42 municipal governments.
Automated analyses are commonly used in municipal governments
. . . and are used to support policy suggestions which are often
implemented. Automated systems in these settings serve in both
educational and political roles.
See id. But see Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data,
78 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 18-27) (arguing that a
characteristic feature of the Algorithmic Society is that new technologies
permit both public and private organizations to govern large populations.
Behind robots, artificial intelligence agents, and algorithms are governments
and businesses organized and staffed by human beings that exercise power
over other human beings mediated through new technologies; therefore it is
important to keep three rules: good faith; private owners’ fiduciary to the
public; and transparency).
22. See Tech CEOs Declare This the Era of Artificial Intelligence,
FORTUNE (June 3, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/03/tech-ceos-artificialintelligence [https://perma.cc/K5KK-69C4] (discussing how “[t]ech companies
are diving into AI analytics research, an industry that will grow to $70 billion
by 2020 from just $8.2 billion in 2013” and that “[a]rtificial intelligence and
machine learning will create computers so sophisticated and godlike that
humans will need to implant ‘neural laces’ in their brains to keep up”).
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systems. Some of these drawbacks include, among other hazards,
damage, suffering, and, most significantly, the loss of control. The
main legal challenge remains: Who owns the products generated by
AI systems and who is responsible for the possibly negative
outcomes stemming from them?
Although diverse solutions have been proposed for dealing
with the important issue of accountability for the works generated by
autonomous AI systems, no one has yet seriously considered the
solutions hidden within the paradigms embedded in the law of
copyright. This Article proposes a new solution for dealing with the
primary struggle regarding accountability of AI systems based on the
copyright regime. The Article will address the fundamental
intersection of AI systems and intellectual property laws. The Article
proposes a solution taken from the copyright domain, one that might
further influence the discussion of accountability for other products,
such as autonomous cars and weapons, the drug industry,
communication, and more. This relationship and the proposed
solution (the new Model) have not been extensively discussed in the
current literature. In an attempt to fill this gap in the literature, this
Article will focus solely on the copyright regime.
Are creative systems such as e-David and The Next Rembrandt
a unique phenomenon within the copyright arena? Not at all.
Interestingly, the AI industry has not skipped the creative and
innovative production of intellectual property and especially
copyrightable works. Paintings generated by AI systems are
displayed in exhibitions worldwide.23 A scene in Ex-Machina, an
independent thriller illustrating the power of AI, raises important
questions of copyright law. In the movie, Ava, a humanoid robot,
gives Caleb a drawing she has created for him as a gift to gain his
love and his trust. 24 Ava’s creative work was not a reproduction; it
was an original piece of art that meets all the criteria for copyright
protection, with the exception that it was created by an AI system. 25
23. See for example the exhibition of Trevor Paglen, A Study of Invisible
Images (Sept. 8–Oct. 21, 2017 at Metro Picture, Gallery, NYC, USA),
http://www.metropictures.com/exhibitions/trevor-paglen4/ [https://perma.cc/3NCWB96F] (showing the spectacular exhibition of paintings made by one AI system—
the Generator/the painter—with the sophisticated feedback of another AI system—
the Discriminator/the trainer—after exchanging millions of examples between these
two AI systems. This technique named Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)
uses AI algorithms by implementing two neural networks used in unsupervised
machine learning contesting each other).
24. EX MACHINA (Universal Pictures International 2015).
25. Id.
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However, copyright works created by AI systems are no longer just
the stuff of science fiction movies. 26 Automated machines, or AI-like
systems, are already producing original works in almost every
copyrightable medium, such as music, 27 poetry, 28 literature,29 news, 30
and many others. 31 Indeed, today it is almost impossible to imagine
any kind of art developed without using at least some digital means.
Eventually, automated systems will replace both creators and
producers of numerous types of works, products, and services.
Following these latest developments, the legal challenge in the
3A era is to decide who owns the copyright once an automated,
autonomous, and advanced machine, or any form of AI system,
generates original and creative works independently of the humans
who created the AI system itself.32 Subsequently, it is unclear who is
entitled to the licensing rights to the product, who is entitled to the
26. Brad Merrill, It’s Happening: Robots May Be the Creative Artists of the
Future, MAKE USE OF (Dec. 17, 2014), http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/happeningrobots-may-creative-artists-future/ [https://perma.cc/8AY7-NPDA].
27. William T. Ralston, Copyright in Computer-Composed Music: HAL
Meets Handel, 52 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 281, 306 (2005) (“The question of
whether machine-generated expression is a proper subject for copyright has been,
and probably will continue to be, a subject of continued debate.”).
28. Samuel Gibbs, Google AI Project Writes Poetry Which Could Make
GUARDIAN
(May
17,
2016,
7:01
AM),
Vogon
Proud,
THE
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/17/googles-ai-write-poetrystark-dramatic-vogons [https://perma.cc/9938-ZASR] (discussing how Google,
Stanford University, and others are working on an artificial intelligent program that
will write poems after exposing the program to novels).
29. Alison Flood, Computer Programmed to Write Its Own Fables, THE
GUARDIAN (Aug. 6, 2014, 4:09 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/aug/
06/computer-programmed-to-write-fables-moral-storytelling-system [https://
perma.cc/6FAC-RL9A] (discussing how a computer can write new and creative
stories).
30. For more examples, see Lin Weeks, Media Law and Copyright
Implications of Automated Journalism, 4 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 67, 87
(2014) (bringing examples of news created by machines and leave the questions
regarding copyright issues open); Steve Lohr, In Case You Wondered, a Real
Human Wrote This Column, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/09/11/business/computer-generated-articles-are-gaining-traction.html
[https://perma.cc/5SWH-M4RC].
31. Peter Kugel, Artificial Intelligence and Visual Art, 14 LEONARDO 137,
137-39 (1981).
32. See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Luis Antonio Velez-Hernandez,
Copyrightability of Artworks Produced by Creative Robots, Driven by Artificial
Intelligence Systems and the Originality Requirement: The Formality-Objective
Model, 19 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 7-8 (arguing that robots that create unique
artworks challenge the concept of originality within copyright law and
recommending the adoption of a more formal and objective approach).
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royalties, and who bears responsibility for copyright infringement
and protecting rights from infringements by others (humans or
otherwise). 33 Another challenge entails figuring out who is entitled to
the moral right,34 if anyone should be at all.35 Should this one roleplayer take it all or are many different stakeholders targeted?
Take, for example, The Next Rembrandt project.
Approximately 350 paintings were analyzed and over 150 gigabytes
of digitally rendered graphics were collected to provide the proper
instruction set to produce the textures and layers necessary for The
Next Rembrandt to have the painterly presence of an original work
by the old master. 36 Given the hard work involved, the number of
people required, and the large monetary investment, one must
wonder who bears the responsibility and accountability for these new
works generated by the AI system? Assuming the owner of the
works (which differs from the owner of the AI system) is the most
efficient entity to impose accountability on, who should be
considered the owner? 37 And which legal rights could he or she
assert? 38
This development re-imagines the whole concept of art and
artists, and as such, it has resulted in the need to re-create the legal
regime that governs art, especially artworks produced by AI
systems. 39 Intellectual property in general, and more specifically
copyright laws, have become one of the most interesting,
challenging, and contrasting fields demonstrating the unique features
33. See id. at 6.
34. Xiyin Tang, The Artist as Brand: Toward a Trademark Conception of
Moral Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 218, 224 (2012); see generally Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid,
Rethinking Employees’ Intellectual Property Moral Rights: A New Model, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE (Miriam Bitton & Lior
Zemer eds., 2012).
35. See Yanisky-Ravid & Velez-Hernandez, supra note 32, at 6-7.
36. Schlackman, supra note 5. See Amanda Levendowski, How
Copyright Law Creates Biased Artificial Intelligence 3 (Mar. 16, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing AI is biased because AI
needs vast amounts of good data, which is protected by copyright laws that
only wealthy entities can afford).
37. See sources cited supra note 9.
38. See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Xiaoqiong (Jackie) Liu, When Artificial
Intelligence Produce Inventions: The 3A Era and an Alternative Model for Patent
Law, CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 19-22) (arguing that the
Multi-Players Model of AI systems places hurdles on entitling one human as the
inventor in the case of AI systems produce inventions).
39. For more examples, see Yanisky-Ravid & Velez-Hernandez, supra
note 32, at 13-14.
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of advanced technology systems. AI systems can be characterized as
creative, unpredictable, independent and autonomous, rational,
evolving, capable of data collection and communication, efficient
and accurate, and capable of exercising free choice among
alternatives. 40 AI systems are also confronting the traditional concept
of looking for the human author behind the creation because the AI
systems themselves may “replace” humans. 41
Traditionally, intellectual property laws, and in particular
copyright laws, have been based on human creators, who creatively,
originally, and independently create works. 42 But with the advent of
AI systems, there is now the possibility that no human is behind the
creative process. Instead, AI systems, as automated, autonomous,
and advanced machines, create and produce works independently,
unexpectedly, and creatively, with self-determination and an
independent choice of what to create and how to create it. Even the
wrong outcome, such as infringements of the rights of others or
counterfeits, may be achieved independently, with no human to
blame. 43 This raises the pressing issue of whether the human or the
AI system should be entitled to ownership rights. This tension
between art, creation, and AI systems is no longer a future concern
or the topic of a science fiction movie, which is why it merits
discussion.
This Article argues that the traditional laws of copyright are
inadequate to cope with the new technology involved in creating
artworks. I further argue that products and services independently
generated by machines challenge the justifications under IP and
copyright laws, which rely on humans to create the works. Copyright
laws are simply ill-equipped to accommodate this tech revolution
and are therefore unlikely to survive in their current form. In order to
address the change in the way art is being created, we must either
rethink these laws, give them new meaning, or be ready to replace
them.
This Article proposes a few alternative scenarios of the new 3A
era in which AI systems are capable of generating independent
works. After discussing the drawbacks of these scenarios, I propose
adopting a new model based on a broader version of the Work Made
40. Id. at 7 (describing the features of AI systems).
41. Id. at 7-8.
42. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 3 (10th ed. 2016).
43. See Crootof, supra note 11, at 1349, 1376-81 (stating the same
argument in regards to autonomous weapons).
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for Hire (WMFH) doctrine. 44 I propose that AI systems should be
seen as the creative employee or self-contractor creators working for
or with the user—the firm, human, or other legal entity operating the
AI system. On the one hand, this proposal reflects and maintains the
human features of the AI system, such as independence, creativity,
and intelligence. On the other hand, this proposal ensures that the
employer or the user maintain the appropriate rights and duties,
which include accountability for the outcomes of the AI system. This
may be the best solution to the current problem of a lack of
accountability for independent AI systems. Seeing the AI system
through the copyright lens will provide new opportunities for
imposing ownership and accountability on the known legal entities.
Implementing a modified WMFH model may structure a feasible
solution in the near future and impose responsibilities on the users
who have affinities to the AI systems.
Part I of this Article will provide background on AI systems by
discussing the different types of systems and their development over
recent years. This Part will describe the features that make AI
systems intelligent and creative and thus substitutes for human
authors. Part II will address the question of who owns, and who takes
the responsibility for, works created by AI systems. This Part
presents two options. The first option is to see one of the humans or
entities involved in the development of an AI system as the one who
bears ownership and accountability for the outcomes of that system.
The second option is to see the AI systems themselves as the digital,
creative, and autonomous authors and hence the owners and the
responsible entities for the works they produce. Part III will consider
the various theoretical justifications for intellectual property
protection. It will examine whether or not these theories lend any
support or justification for these options or, alternatively, for a new
option. Part IV will discuss the proposed model of AI systems, the
WMFH model, and its implications for AI systems. Part V will
discuss how U.S. copyright law is unprepared for the recent
developments and challenges of AI systems, focusing primarily on
the human authorship principle and extending copyright protection to
works generated by automated creative AI systems. After
determining that existing law is somewhat irrelevant and outdated, I
propose that the AI WMFH model can cure not only the
inapplicability of current copyright law to new and advanced AI
systems, but can also cure the desire to control these systems as well
44.

See infra Part III.
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as to impose accountability on a legal known entity, such as the user
of AI systems. By implementing the proposed model—one that sees
AI systems as independent contractors or employees of the users and
amending the law to accommodate the AI WMFH model—we can
control the users of these systems, thus preventing situations in
which the public loses control over the unknown outcomes of the AI
systems.
I. WHAT ARE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS? HISTORICAL
AND TECHNICAL PERSPECTIVES
Before discussing the accountability of AI systems from a
copyright perspective, one must address more basic questions: How
does an AI system work? What does it mean that the system can
autonomously create works? I argue that in order to address
questions of accountability for AI systems, one must understand
what lies beneath the mysterious concept of AI systems. This Part
will clarify how automated AI systems function by focusing on one
type of AI system that I have named the “pattern recognition” or
“similarities identifier” AI system. This understanding is a
fundamental step before further discussion takes place concerning
the accountability of AI systems from a copyright perspective.
A. The Different Kinds of AI Systems: The Old vs. The New and
Advanced
AI algorithms vary significantly. 45 A diverse array of AI
algorithms has been developed to cover a wide variety of data and
problems. 46 This diversity of learning architectures and algorithms

45. M.I. Jordan & T.M. Mitchell, Machine Learning: Trends, Perspectives,
and Prospects, 349 SCI. MAG. 255, 255 (2015) (representing candidate programs,
such as decision trees, mathematical functions, and general programming languages,
and searching through these programs, such as optimization algorithms with wellunderstood convergence guarantees and evolutionary search methods that evaluate
successive generations of randomly mutated programs).
46. See generally TREVOR HASTIE, ROBERT TIBSHIRANI & JEROME
FRIEDMAN, THE ELEMENTS OF STATISTICAL LEARNING: DATA MINING, INFERENCE,
AND PREDICTION (2d ed. 2009). See generally KEVIN P. MURPHY, MACHINE
LEARNING: A PROBABILISTIC PERSPECTIVE (2012) (offering “a comprehensive and
self-contained introduction to the field of machine learning, based on a unified,
probabilistic approach” and stressing a principled, model-based approach often
using language of graphical models to specify models in a concise and intuitive
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reflects the diverse needs of applications capturing different kinds of
mathematical structures and offering different levels of amenability
to post-hoc visualization and explanation. It provides varying tradeoffs between computational complexity, the amount of data, and
performance.47
Defining AI systems is not an easy task. There are as many
definitions as there are types of AI systems. 48 John McCarthy, who
coined the term “Artificial Intelligence,” did not provide an
independent definition, while scholars Stuart Russell and Peter
Norvig suggested almost ten different definitions. 49 Definitions
generally vary according to the targeted subject, emphasizing
different aspects of AI systems. 50 Based on its features, AI can be
defined as a system capable of performing tasks that would normally
require human intelligence, such as recognition, decision-making,
creation, learning, evolving, and communicating. 51 AI can also be
way); Overview, MIT PRESS, https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/machine-learning-0
[https://perma.cc/8K3F-BMCY] (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
47. Jordan & Mitchell, supra note 45, at 257 (arguing that large-scale deep
learning systems have had a major effect in recent years in computer vision and
speech recognition).
48. Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial Intelligent Systems: Risks,
Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353, 360 (2016)
(describing how, unfortunately, there does not yet appear to be any widely accepted
definition of AI even among experts, whose definitions vary widely and focus on
myriad of ways AI systems are interconnected with human function—the ability to
learn, or consciousness and self-awareness—which are difficult to define).
49. STUART J. RUSSELL & PETER NORVIG, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A
MODERN APPROACH 2-14, 1034 (3d ed. 2010) (describing definitions include
thinking and acting humanly, as well as thinking and acting rationally; the definition
is based on human features); see also Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 38, at 10-11
(listing different definitions of AI systems); What Is Artificial Intelligence?, JOHN
MCCARTHY’S HOME PAGE (Nov. 12, 2007), http://www-formal.stanford.edu/jmc/
whatisai/node1.html [https://perma.cc/4MF3-KJAH].
50. RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 49, at 5-12 (discussing different
approaches to AI, such as philosophy, psychology, cognitive math).
51. Id. at 14; see also MARCUS HUTTER, UNIVERSAL ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE: SEQUENTIAL DECISIONS BASED ON ALGORITHMIC PROBABILITY 12526, 231 (W. Brauer, G. Rozenberg & A. Salomaa eds., 2005) (arguing that AI
system is a form of intelligence, as a result of features like creativity, problem
solving, pattern recognition, classification, learning, induction, deduction, building
analogies, optimization, surviving in an environment, language processing, and
knowledge).
Artificial
Intelligence,
OXFORD
DICTIONARY,
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/artificial_intelligence (last visited Jan.
15, 2018) (“The theory and development of computer systems able to perform tasks
normally requiring human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech
recognition, decision-making, and translation between languages.”).

674

Michigan State Law Review

2017

described as an instrument that can make existing solutions more
efficient by using all data that is reachable by the AI system. Various
contexts, such as medical treatments or chess strategies, also lead to
different definitions of AI systems. 52
Until recently, the “artificial intelligence” field was dominated
by quasi-AI systems called “expert systems,” which mainly used a
rules-based decision-making process.53 Put more simply, these
systems were not fully autonomous and, therefore, not truly
“intelligent.” They lacked the ability to learn and produce
unpredictable results because they mostly acted in ways
predetermined by their human-created programming. 54 These
systems could not evolve through learning. Consequently, they could
not be truly creative because they could only “know” information
that a human had placed in their “knowledge base.” 55 Policy makers,
nevertheless, still see these systems as the model of advanced
technology. In many machines that create artworks, even though the
software has some discretion in how to create the final composition,
the scope of that discretion is limited to the operation of
programming created by the human inventors. 56 The significance of
52. See Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 38, at 9 (describing why AI
systems are intelligent).
53. Dana S. Rao, Neural Networks: Here, There, and Everywhere—An
Examination of Available Intellectual Property Protection for Neural Networks in
Europe and the United States, 30 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 509, 509 (1997)
(examining “whether U.S. patent law applies to software-implemented neural
networks in light of recent decisions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, [as well as] analyz[ing] whether software networks can receive patent
protection in the EC, based on Trade Related Intellectual Property Side (TRIPS)
agreements and the Berne Convention, EC directives, Member-State statutes, and
Member-State case law”).
54. Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs,
Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106
HARV. L. REV. 977, 1038-39 (1993) (addressing the claim that it will eventually be
impossible to assimilate computer-generated works into the copyright system
because they may have no obvious human author, and concluding not only that the
case law contains no persuasive objection to extending copyright protection to these
works, but also that such an extension would fulfill the constitutional imperative of
promoting progress in these areas).
55. Id. (concluding that, despite arguments that incorporating new
technologies into the current copyright system will lead to overprotection, the
current regime is flexible enough to address concerns).
56. See e-David. A Painting Process, UNIVERSITÄT KONSTANZ (Apr. 24,
2017) https://cms.uni-konstanz.de/informatik/edavid/news [https://perma.cc/UX4TXAAB] (describing the combination of human input and machine learning involved
in the creation of the e-David painting robot).
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this from the copyright perspective is that human input is still
necessary, not only for a work to be produced, but for it to have any
sort of creative content. An expert system has become a tool for
human creativity. 57
Even though this type of quasi-AI system still exists, it does not
represent the new standard of today, which is the focus of this study.
AI technology has advanced rapidly. After working for decades on
creating a new type of AI system, computer researchers have
recently succeeded in creating a system that can ultimately have
serious ramifications for copyright law.58 The current AI systems,
functioning intelligently and using learning components
autonomously, complicate the discussion. These systems are called
“neural networks” because they mimic the function of human brains
by absorbing and distributing their information processing capacity
to groups of receptors that function like neurons; they find and create
connections and similarities within the data they process. 59 Any one
of these units, called “perceptrons,” can “know” whether and how
much to react given a particular input; taken together, the system of
these responses governs the action of the whole machine. 60 The
difference between a neural network and an expert system is that the
former model allows the system to “learn” through trial and error.61
Given a goal, the system can try random outputs until it successfully
performs the desired action and then repeat that response the next
time it gets the same or a similar input. 62 Consequently, a neural
network could, like a human, “learn” how to paint, write, or compose
and generate a work whose creative content is not the result of any
human intervention. At first glance, the human inventor or
programmer of such a machine seems to have no more claim to a
copyright in such a work than an artist’s mother has to her child’s
work, or than a camera manufacturer has to the photos taken by
photographers, or than a piano manufacturer has to the melody being
created by the musicians while using the instrument. After all,
57. Miller, supra note 54, at 980. “A congressional committee has held
‘oversight’ hearings on the subject but has taken no action.” Id. at 980 n.7 (citing
Computers and Intellectual Property: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Intellectual Prop., and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
101st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 1 (1989 & 1990)).
58. Rao, supra note 53, at 509.
59. Id. (discussing how the developments of neural networks, which allows
a system to “learn” information while training, has recently rapidly expanded).
60. Id. at 511.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 509.
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neither the inventor and programmer nor the mother nor the
manufacturer contributed anything to the creative process except the
artist him-, her-, or itself.
Following Scherer’s evasive definition of an intelligent
system—“machines that are capable of performing tasks that, if
performed by a human, would be said to require intelligence” 63— one
may still ask, what makes the system so intelligent? In other words,
how does the system really work?
B. How Do Artificial Intelligence Systems Actually Work?
The process of recognition involves the classification or
identification of objects, persons, events, or situations. Research
about the human brain promoted the development of one group of
algorithms, AI (sometimes named by its learning capability—
Machine Learning (ML)), capable of identifying objects or
automatically classifying them in a similar way to what we believe
and know about human perception and pattern recognition. 64 One
way the AI system functions, among many others, is by following
the process of human perception in a few stages. 65 First, the
algorithm is presented with multiple examples and their correct
classification (pictures of dogs, faces, signals from the body, or any
other data that can be subject to patterns of similarities). Second, the
algorithm breaks the data down into “tiny” electronic signals,
undetectable by humans, and tries to identify hidden insights,
similarities, patterns, and connections—without being explicitly
programmed on where to look (“training”). 66 Thus, the patterns and
63. Scherer, supra note 48, at 362-64 (arguing for a reform in tort law
regulation to cover AI systems liability).
64. See Mauricio Orozco-Alzate & Germán Castellanos-Domínguez,
Nearest Feature Rules and Dissimilarity Representations for Face Recognition
Problems, in FACE RECOGNITION 337, 337-56 (Kresimir Delac & Mislav Grgic eds.,
2007); see also Mauricio Orozco-Alzate & César Germán Castellanos-Domínguez,
Comparison of the Nearest Feature Classifiers for Face Recognition, 17 MACHINE
VISION & APPLICATIONS 279, 279 (2006) [hereinafter Orozco-Alzate & CastellanosDomínguez, Comparison of the Nearest Feature Classifiers].
65. See generally Orozco-Alzate & Castellanos-Domínguez, Comparison of
the Nearest Feature Classifiers, supra note 64.
66. Anders Krogh, What Are Artificial Neural Networks?, 26 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 195, 195-97 (2008) (describing generally how AI systems work).
See generally James J. DiCarlo, Davide Zoccolan & Nicole C. Rust, How Does The
Brain Solve Visual Object Recognition?, 73 NEURON 415 (2012) (explaining that
neuroscientists are providing new clues and constraints about the algorithmic
solution). See in practice Datasets For Machine Learning & Artificial Intelligence
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similarities that the algorithm finds (or creates) may not be clear or
completely understood by the programmers, trainers, or those who
actively functionalize the system. In fact, “[m]any developers of AI
systems now recognize that, for many applications, it can be far
easier to train a system by showing it examples of desired inputoutput behavior than to program it manually by anticipating the
desired response for all possible inputs.” 67 Astonishingly, the trainer
can be human or another AI system. 68 Third, performance improves
with experience and evolves with new data to which the system is
exposed. 69 In other words, the system is constantly evolving as a
result of new data it has either autonomously found or been inputted
with by data providers. For example, if we would like the AI system
to create music, we would expose it to many songs or rhythms from
different clusters of music, and the AI system would find
interconnections unfamiliar even to the programmer. The AI system
would keep evolving when exposed to new music in the future and
would eventually be able to create new original music independently
and without copying other works. 70 A similar process would take
place for writing new stories, painting, creating dances, programing
design, programming software, detecting signals in roads, producing
new drugs, and even designing AI systems. 71
(AI) Training, CLICKWORKER, https://www.clickworker.com/machine-learning-aiartificial-intelligence/ [https://perma.cc/CAA3-YKEW] (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
67. Jordan & Mitchell, supra note 45, at 255 (illustrating the widespread
nature of the adoption of data-intensive machine-learning methods).
68. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Larry Hardesty, Artificial-Intelligence System Surfs Web to
Improve Its Performance, MIT NEWS (Nov. 10, 2016), http://news.mit.edu/2016/
artificial-intelligence-system-surfs-web-improve-performance-1110/ [https://
perma.cc/2DJK-JKBT].
70. William Hochberg, When Robots Write Songs, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 7,
2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2014/08/computers-thatcompose/374916 [https://perma.cc/SMQ6-LCDY]. EMI is a software program that,
although not intelligent, has produced aesthetically convincing new music.
Intelligence seeks survival by the exercise of power over a surrounding
environment. In composition, intelligence equals decision making. Every
composition results from the selection of a finite set of constraints to operate on
selected materials; even the most intuitive decision remains itself a decision, and
consequently, a product of constraints. See Patrício da Silva, David Cope and
Experiments in Musical Intelligence, SPECTRUM PRESS 1-36 (2003),
http://eclass.uoa.gr/modules/document/file.php/MUSIC124/%CE%94%CE%B9%C
E%B1%CE%BB%CE%AD%CE%BE%CE%B5%CE%B9%CF%82/da-silva-davidcope-and-emi.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8KG-FQRB].
71. See also Rana el Kaliouby, This App Knows How You Feel – From the
Look on Your Face, TED (2015), https://www.ted.com/talks/rana_el_kaliouby_this_
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We have already been caught unprepared by the latest
developments. Traditional intellectual property laws have become
irrelevant for new AI systems. Other fields, such as tort and criminal
law, may also be unable to solve the emerging issues. Furthermore,
the developments are proceeding rapidly. We have to cope not just
with existing automated AI systems that create independent, creative,
and original artworks, but we also have to be ready for the next
generation of AI that will be capable of unsupervised learning, a
paradigm in machine-learning research that uses random methods in
unexpected and dangerous ways. 72
C. What Makes Artificial Intelligence Systems Creative?
Over the past two decades, AI has grown from a laboratory
curiosity to a practical technology. It has emerged as an important
tool in developing practical software for computer vision; speech
recognition; natural language processing; and creating artworks,
inventions, and other applications. 73 To understand the challenges
posed by AI-created artworks, it is important to understand how
automated AI systems produce new and creative works, which would
have been copyrightable had humans created them. 74
I identify ten features of AI systems’ algorithms that are
important to the discussion of accountability of AI systems based on
the copyright discourse. 75 AI systems can be embedded with all or
some of these features, all of which are interrelated and partially
overlapping. By using these ten features, AI systems are designed to
independently create works of useful art. 76
app_knows_how_you_feel_from_the_look_on_your_face [https://perma.cc/FY3929AN].
72. HASTIE, TIBSHIRANI & FRIEDMAN, supra note 46, at 18-22 (stressing a
principled model-based approach, often using the language of graphical models to
specify models in a concise and intuitive way).
73. Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 38, at 2.
74. Id.
75. See HALLEVY, supra note 11, at 175 (discussing five different attributes
that one would expect an intelligent entity to have—communication, internal
knowledge, external knowledge, goal-driven behavior, creativity); see also YaniskyRavid & Velez-Hernandez, supra note 32, at 2 (proposing the adoption of the
objective approach to copyright, which enables copyrightability of works produced
by creative robots).
76. Jason D. Lohr, Managing Patent Rights in the Age of Artificial
Intelligence, LEGALTECH NEWS (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.legaltechnews.com/
id=1202765385194/Managing-Patent-Rights-in-the-?slreturn=20160819081749
[https://perma.cc/6BTC-9DLR] (arguing that much of the AI in the use today is
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(1) Creativity. AI systems are capable of more than just
copying other works from accessible sources. They operate as
creative devices capable of creating entirely new and original
works. 77 This feature is crucial in the intellectual property realm and
in particular when discussing copyrightable artworks.
(2) Autonomous and independent. 78 A device is independent or
autonomous if it can accomplish a high-level task on its own,
without external intervention.79 Such systems may work
independently, with minimum human intervention.80 In this way, the
AI systems are able to replace authors and other creators, to
autonomously produce new artworks. 81
(3) Unpredictable and new results. AI systems are based on
algorithms capable of incorporating random input, resulting in
unpredictable routes to the optimal solution, and hence creating
unpredictable works (from the software programmers’ point of
view). 82 An AI system can draw a new painting, which, unlike
copying an existing work, is new and unpredictable. After being
exposed to colors, shapes, and techniques that are in the public

referred to as “soft” AI systems, where the AI uses computational intelligence to
analyze relevant data and attempt to solve a specific problem).
77. See HUTTER, supra note 51, at 2 (mentioning creativity as one of the
main features of AI); see also Scherer, supra note 48, at 364-65 (describing how AI
systems detected breast cancer prognosis by checking cells of supportive tissues
through a chess player creative move); HALLEVY, supra note 11, at 176 (arguing that
an AI system must be creative by finding alternative ways to solve problems).
78. Crootof, supra note 19, at 1854-63 (describing the difficulty of deciding
on a definition for autonomous weapons and suggesting a definition based on the AI
(weapon) system being able (1) to come to conclusions (2) derived from gathered
information and (3) is capable of independently selecting actions (selecting and
engaging targets)).
79. Lucy Suchman & Jutta Weber, Human-Machine Autonomies, in
AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS: LAW, ETHICS, POLICY 75, 76 (Nehal Bhuta et al.
eds., 2016).
80. See Terence Davis, The AI Revolution: Is The Future Finally Now?,
ARN (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.arnnet.com.au/article/617707/ai-revolutionfuture-finally-now [https://perma.cc/UX4T-XAAB] (“What is called AI even today
is in fact, the leveraging of machines with minimal – though not zero – human
intelligence to solve specific, narrow problems.”).
81. See generally Yanisky-Ravid & Velez-Hernandez, supra note 32.
82. See Jonathon Keats, John Koza Built an Invention Machine, POPULAR
SCI. (Apr 19, 2006), https://www.popsci.com/scitech/article/2006-04/john-koza-hasbuilt-invention-machine [https://perma.cc/3ZB3-79LJ].
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domain, the system can “break” the data into digital components,
recompose them, and create new and unexpected artworks. 83
(4) Capable of data collection and communication with outside
data. A significant feature of an AI system is that it can actively
“search” for outside data. For example, e-David might autonomously
take pictures of the outside word and draw them into new, original,
and creative works. Communication is thus a necessary feature of an
AI system. 84
(5) Learning capability. Based on the data it has gathered, an
AI system can continue to process data by receiving feedback and
improving the results. 85
(6) Evolving. As a result of the new input and the AI system’s
capacity for continuous processing, the system might constantly find
new patterns and similarities and hence change the outcomes. In this
sense, the system is constantly evolving. This feature is at the core of
AI and data science. 86
(7) Rational-intelligent system. An intelligent system is one
with a rational mechanism capable of perceiving data and deciding
which activities or omissions would maximize its probabilities of
success in achieving a certain goal. 87
83. See Lawrence Hunter, Molecular Biology for Computer Scientists, in
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 1, 12-15 (Lawrence Hunter
ed., 1993) (describing how similarities enable the composition of cells by its parts as
membranes, proteins and other parts by AI systems).
84. See generally id.; see also Deussen et al., supra note 1, at 1
(discussing how, as part of the Rembrandt project, the robot had a camera that
kept on photographing); Matthew Field, Facebook Shuts Down a Robots After
They Invented Their Own Language, THE TELEGRAPH (Aug. 1, 2017, 10:21
AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2017/08/01/facebook-shutsrobots-invent-language/ [https://perma.cc/8FRE-67VZ] (the chatbots were
meant to learn how to negotiate by mimicking human trading and bartering;
however, when the social network paired two of the programs, nicknamed
Alice and Bob, to trade against each other, they started to develop their
own bizarre form of communication that the researchers could not understand).
85. RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 49, at 928-69 (explaining the process of
perception of AI systems, in which the systems are being connected to the raw
world, including image formation, color, edge detection, texture, segmentation of
images, objects recognition, reconstructing the 3D world, and motions).
86. Jordan & Mitchell, supra note 45, at 255, 257 (discussing recent
progress in machine learning and illustrating the wide-spread nature of the adoption
of data-intensive machine-learning methods).
87. RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 49, at 3-4, 27, 34-56, 973-85
(describing AI systems as being capable of taking “rational” actions based on
environmental input); see also HUTTER, supra note 51, at 2, 125-26, 231 (discussing
how AI systems can solve problems by using features such as learning, induction,
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(8) Efficiency. AI systems are capable of accurately,
efficiently, and rapidly processing vast volumes of data—well
beyond the ability of the human brain. 88
(9) “Free choice.” AI systems are able to choose between
alternatives in order to arrive at the best outcome. 89 E-David, for
example, chooses between lights, colors, and shapes while drawing. 90
(10) Goal oriented. AI systems function according to goals
such as creating, drawing, writing stories or news, or composing
melodies or poems. 91
AI systems that create artworks incorporate, to a certain level,
all of these ten features. Once we understand these features, and that
the AI systems create outcomes independently and autonomously,
we realize that the rights available under copyright laws cannot be
afforded only to human authors, and thus, the traditional copyright
laws may be inapplicable. 92 As technology advances, AI systems
have become increasingly capable of mimicking part of the functions
that we once considered intrinsic to the human mind’s creativity. AI
deduction, building analogies and optimization, as well as using knowledge); DAVID
L. POOLE & ALAN K. MACKWORTH, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: FOUNDATION OF
COMPUTATIONAL AGENTS 71, 283-334, 597-611 (2010) (describing AI systems as
agents of cognitive skills such as: problem solving, searching for data, learning and
evolving, rational planning, and more).
88. GEORGE F. LUGER, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: STRUCTURES AND
STRATEGIES FOR COMPLEX PROBLEM SOLVING 26 (6th ed. 2016) (arguing that AI can
refer to all programming techniques trying to solve problems more efficiently than
algorithmic solutions and can operate close to the intelligence of human behavior);
Woodrow Hartzog et al., Inefficiently Automated Law Enforcement, 2015 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 1763, 1765-67, 1793-95 (arguing that automated machines are more
efficient than human but this is a risky factor and that law enforcement of automated
machine should preserve inefficiency for ethical reasons).
89. Scherer, supra note 48, at 361-62 (arguing that even when AI systems
act rationally, they can still pose public risk—killing efficiently, for example).
90. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
91. See supra note 66.
92. RUSSELL & NORVIG, supra note 49, at 4-7. The discourse about AI
systems includes controversial arguments about the philosophy regarding AI
systems. For example, can machines perceive and understand (i.e., can they pass the
Chinese test)? Are human intelligence and machine intelligence the same (i.e., can
they pass the Turing test)? What is intelligence? What does it mean that a machine
think or act rationally; can a machine be self-aware? Can a machine be original or
creative? Id. However, one must also be aware of the “Eliza Effect.” See ROBERT
TRAPPL, PAOLO PETTA & SABINE PAYR, EMOTIONS IN HUMAN ARTIFACTS 353 (Robert
Trappl, Paolo Petta & Sabine Payr eds., 2002) (describing the “Eliza Effect” as the
tendency for people to treat machines or programs that are responsive as having
more intelligence than they really do, as having human traits, and finding analogies
between human behaviors and computer behaviors).
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systems will be able to improve specific human skills, not only in
terms of accuracy or capacity to process vast amounts of data, but
also in terms of creativity, autonomy, novelty, and other features
necessary for establishing copyrightable works. Moreover,
autonomous AI systems will be able to develop new artworks
without significant guidance or instructions from humans. 93
Generally, the human or entity behind the process is at the
forefront of legal discussions. This Article calls for a different
solution, one from an alternate point of view—the intellectual
property and copyright laws at stake in this area. The inquiry begins
with considering whether AI systems may own the products they
produce. While this Article agrees that understanding the human-like
features of AI may lead to the conclusion that an artwork being
generated by an AI system might belong to the AI system, unlike
other scholars, this Article argues that the traditional copyright laws
may be irrelevant and inapplicable to these situations and that either
modifications or other legal tools should replace them. 94 The next
Part will begin by addressing the discourse of ownership and
accountability for AI systems producing original works.
II. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR AUTONOMOUS AI SYSTEMS—THE
COPYRIGHT PERSPECTIVE
AI systems are commonly used to generate works for personal
or industrial goals. Who should benefit from the works being
produced by the AI systems? Who should bear responsibility when
something goes wrong? In other words, who is entitled to the rights?
Who should be accountable when AI systems infringe on third
parties’ rights or counterfeit existing works? Should it be the
programmers, the trainers, the users, or, perhaps, the AI systems
themselves?

93. See Ryan Abbott, I Think, Therefore I Invent: Creative Computers and
the Future of Patent Law, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1079, 1080 (2016) (stating that AI
systems and computers are already generating patentable inventions and arguing that
AI should receive patent rights in its inventions); see also Lohr, supra note 76
(discussing how AI systems will be able to able to operate without significant
guidance or instruction and to develop new products and processes).
94. See Abbott, supra note 93, at 1080-81 (stating that AI systems own the
IP rights).
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A. Accountability Matters
Advanced technologies, such as AI systems, are forcing us as a
society to face new ethical and legal challenges and to rethink basic
concepts such as ownership and accountability. Scholars have not yet
deeply discussed the notion of copyright accountability for
infringements involving AI systems, even though AI systems are
themselves copyrightable.
According to scholars such as Hanoch Dagan, Michael Heller,
and others, ownership of property rights (applicable also to
intellectual property rights) is not merely a question of benefits
arising from the right to exclude others from enjoying, using, or
licensing the objects.95 It is also a question of accountability for using
it with consideration for other humans’ and entities’ rights.
Moreover, ownership may also entail rights of others to enjoy the
property. 96 This is also true when discussing AI systems. Adopting
this accountability for property rights approach of Dagan and Heller
into the discussion on intellectual property rights, in regard to works
generated by AI systems, allows us to bind together the benefits and
accountabilities of ownership.
The main risk we face today and in the near future is that of
losing control over the operation of AI systems. 97 Moreover, we risk
losing control not only of one AI system, but also two or more AI
systems acting in concert “behind our backs.” Therefore, I have
decided to focus on accountability for works generated by AI
systems 98 as AI systems threaten all social and legal regimes. 99
95. Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE
L.J. 549, 559-60 (2001) (seeing ownership of property as accountability for others);
Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
1409, 1421-22, 1438-39 (2012) (property law regimes cannot be based on the right
of exclusion alone; rather, they must be based on human relationships).
96. See Schlackman, supra note 5.
97. See Research Priorities for Robust and Beneficial Artificial
Intelligence, FUTURE OF LIFE INST., https://futureoflife.org/ai-open-letter
[https://perma.cc/8FL8-UP6Q] (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
98. Ariel Ezrachi & Maurice E. Stucke, Artificial Intelligence & Collusion:
When Computers Inhibit Competition 37-38 (Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper
No. 18; Univ. of Tenn. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 267, 2015). See also Field,
supra note 84.
99. ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE
PROMISE AND PERILS OF THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY 56-82, 85-144, 147-202
(2016) (describing how consumers reap many benefits from online shopping and
how the sophisticated algorithms behind online retail are changing the nature of
market competition, including in negative ways. The authors describe one danger as
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Professor Jack Balkin describes several problems of AI
systems. 100 The first problem entails the distribution of rights and
responsibilities among human beings when non-human agents create
benefits, like artistic works, or cause harms, like physical injuries.101
The difficulty arises from the fact that the behavior of robotic and AI
systems is “emergent,” meaning their actions may be unpredictable
or unconstrained by human expectations. 102 Robotics and AI thus
feature emergent behaviors that escape human planning and
expectations. 103 Balkin further cautions that we should not consider
all features of a technology to be essential without first considering
how the technology is used in society. 104 It would thus be unhelpful
to codify certain features as “essential” because they may in reality
be transient features arising from current uses and social trends. 105
B. AI Systems as Independent Legal Entities: The Personhood and
Consciousness Approach vs. The Firm Approach
Many scholars have recently adopted the idea that autonomy,
creativity, and spontaneous evolution of AI systems leads to the
recognition of AI systems (and robot embedded systems) as
independent legal entities entitled to legal and commercial rights and
duties. 106 In other words, scholars argue that the AI system is an
being computers colluding with one another. They describe a second danger as
behavioral discrimination based on companies tracking and profiling consumers to
get them to buy goods at the highest price they are willing to pay. The authors posit
a third danger as the “frenemy” relationship between super-platforms and
independent app developers. They caution that data-driven monopolies dictate the
flow of personal data and determine who gets to exploit potential buyers); Crootof,
supra note 19, at 1842-43 (describing the threat of tort war over autonomous
weapons).
100.
See Jack M. Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR.
45, 45 (2015).
101. See id. at 46, 48-49.
102. See id. at 45-46.
103. Id. at 46 (arguing that robotics and AI raise the “substitution effect,”
meaning people will substitute robots and AI agents for living things but only in
certain ways and only for certain purposes. Balkin argues this substitution is likely
to be incomplete, contextual, unstable, and often opportunistic).
104. See id. at 45.
105. Id. (contending that innovation in technology is not just about tools and
techniques, but also economic, social and legal relations, which in turn affects how
technologies may change).
106. SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR
AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS 1-3 (2011) (arguing for the legal personhood of
an artificial agent that will soon be independent, and discussing the artificial agent as
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autonomous legal entity that may, and should, be responsible for the
outcome of its own actions or omissions.107 This conclusion may be
based on two alternative premises. First, the defining features of AI
systems—intelligence, rationality, independence, and the like—are
similar to those of humans; therefore, they should be treated as
independent entities with legal rights and duties. Alternatively, AI
systems are analogous to firms, which are separate, non-human legal
entities capable of possessing legal rights, benefits, and
responsibilities.
1. The Personhood and Consciousness Approach to AI Systems
Can robots be human persons and hence entitled to legal rights
(and duties)? Can Ava, one of the robots in the movie Ex Machina,
be considered the owner of the copyright in her painting and have the
duty to avoid infringing other humans’ or robots’ rights? 108 Or can
only humans be persons?
“Artificial intelligence already exhibits many human
characteristics. Given our history of denying rights to certain
humans, we should recognize that robots are [like] people and have
human rights.” 109 This statement by Harvard Law Professor Glenn
capable of having “knowledge” and decision-making ability); Abbott, supra note 93,
at 1080 (arguing that artificial intelligence systems should be considered inventors
for the purposes of patent law). See also JOHN FRANK WEAVER, ROBOTS ARE PEOPLE
TOO: HOW SIRI, GOOGLE CAR, AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE WILL FORCE US TO
CHANGE OUR LAWS 1, 3-4 (2014) (arguing that robots are independent entities).
107. Abbott, supra note 93, at 1080 (arguing that computers are already
generating patentable subject matters qualifying as inventors and overtaking human
inventors as primary source of new discoveries and inventions, and therefore, AI
should receive patent rights in their inventions). See also Colin R. Davies, An
Evolutionary Step in Intellectual Property Rights – Artificial Intelligence and
Intellectual Property, 27 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 601, 617-19 (2011),
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0267364911001518 [https://
perma.cc/RR6K-W56M] (claiming that the systems can be the authors and the
inventors).
108. EX MACHINA, supra note 24.
109. Glenn Cohen, Should We Grant AI Moral and Legal Personhood?,
ARTIFICIAL BRAIN (Sept. 24, 2016), http://artificialbrain.xyz/should-we-grant-aimoral-and-legal-personhood [https://perma.cc/ELL3-CQRK]; see also Big Think,
A.I. Ethics: Should We Grant Them Moral and Legal Personhood?, YOUTUBE (Sept.
23, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gvcbOSAkF2M [https://perma.cc/
6QAR-2W4N] (discussing the distinction between people and human beings, and
suggesting granting more rights to AI systems so that we do not err and find
ourselves on the wrong side of history even though, at the heart of the matter, the
idea scares a lot of people).

686

Michigan State Law Review

2017

Cohen reflects not only his claim that AI already does much of what
human beings can do, but also the reality that the digital software of
AI systems, which mimics human intelligence, is already far superior
to our own. 110 Ongoing developments in natural language and
emotion detection suggest that AI will continue its encroachment on
the domain of human abilities.
The personhood approach to AI systems sees the systems as
capable of experiencing consciousness. The goal of the artificial
consciousness approach is to explore the cognitive abilities in
robots. 111 Igor Aleksander suggested more than a dozen principles for
artificial consciousness, including conscious and unconscious states,
learning, memorizing, prediction, self-awareness, representation of
meaning, language, will, instinct, and emotion.112 The aim of
artificial consciousness is to define whether and how these and other
aspects of consciousness can be synthesized in an engineered artifact
such as a digital computer.
By virtue of modeling itself, AI systems have sensations and
are able to make decisions freely. This can be regarded as having
consciousness. 113 The ability to produce consciousness—the ability
to experience things, which is found in humans as well as in AI
systems—means the ability to recognize, allocate, organize, and
recall cognitive sources. Consciousness occurs when we have a
symbol for things. We do not know what taste or smell means for
any individual human, but we can recognize it by connecting it to an
existing symbol. 114 This may also be true for AI systems. This
approach of computationalism sees the human brain, essentially, as a
110. See Cohen, supra note 109.
111. James A. Reggia, The Rise of Machine Consciousness: Studying
Consciousness with Computational Models, 44 NEURAL NETWORKS 112, 112-31
(2013) (describing the artificial consciousness approach also known as AC).
112. See generally Igor Aleksander, Machine Consciousness, in BLACKWELL
COMPANION TO CONSCIOUSNESS (Max Velmans & Susan Schneider eds., 2007).
113. Drew McDermott, Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSCIOUSNESS 117, 140-150 (Philip David Zelazo,
Morris Moscovitch & Evan Thompson eds., 2007) (claiming that tests such as the
Turing test and the Chinese box test are not necessarily relevant to the
computational theory of consciousness. In Turing’s test a person tries to distinguish
a computer from a person by carrying on typed conversations with the computer. If
the person who judges the system thinks the computer is human about 50% of the
time, then the computer passes the test and is considered less distinguishable from a
human. The Chinese Box test concerns situations where a machine uses inputs to
create reasonable and logical outcomes, but does not “understand” how or why those
outcomes are the correct responses).
114. Id. at 118.
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computer. 115 Once we establish the concept of an impersonal level of
meaning in brains and computers, we can introduce the idea of a selfmodel, a device that a robot or a person could use to answer
questions about how it interacts with the world. 116 This idea was
introduced by Minsky almost forty years ago, and has since been
explored by others. 117 Other scholars claim that “consciousness is a
property of complex systems that have a particular ‘cause-effect’
repertoire.” 118 They interact with the world in ways similar to the
way the brain does. “If you were to build a computer that has the
same circuitry as the brain, this computer would also have
consciousness associated with it. . . . However, the same is not true
for digital simulations.” 119
This approach sees the AI system as a person and thus as
capable of bearing rights and duties. An alternative approach
imposes rights and duties on AI systems from a different angle—that
of the firm approach.
2. The Corporate Approach
The corporation as a legal entity can serve as a legal basis for
imposing rights and duties on AI systems. Corporations are legal
entities subject to a legal regime, including corporate, labor, and
even criminal law. 120 Therefore, the question relating to AI entities
has become: Does the growing intelligence of AI entities subject
them, as any other legal entity, to legal social control?121
115. Id.
116. See generally id. at 117-150.
117. See MARVIN L. MINSKY, SEMANTIC INFORMATION PROCESSING 1
(Marvin Minksy ed., 1968) (discussing multiple experiments that explored
intelligent machines nearly four decades ago); Aaron Sloman & Ron Chrisley,
Virtual Machines and Consciousness, 10 J. CONSCIOUSNESS STUD. 1, 18 (2003).
118. Antonio Regalado, What it Will Take for Computers to Be Conscious,
MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 2, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/531146/whatit-will-take-for-computers-to-be-conscious [https://perma.cc/JPP5-LBSD].
119. Id.
120. See STEVEN BOX, POWER, CRIME AND MYSTIFICATION 16-79 (1983);
John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul To Damn: No Body To Kick”: An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386, 386-87
(1981); Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, The Allocation of Responsibility for
Corporate Crime: Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability, 11 SYDNEY L.
REV. 468, 469 (1988).
121. See generally Bruce G. Buchanan & Thomas E. Headrick, Some
Speculation About Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 23 STAN. L. REV. 40
(1970); E. Donald Elliott, Holmes and Evolution: Legal Process as Artificial
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There are several consequences to this approach. In Europe, for
example, there is a strong movement arguing that robots should pay
taxes. 122 Scholars have also proposed that AI systems should be held
liable for any criminal offenses committed by the systems. 123
If assessed through the lens of copyright laws, this approach
would result in AI systems’ ownership of the intellectual property
products and processes they generate. 124 Under this view, the AI
system is the protagonist: when it acts autonomously, it is the true
creator or producer of the products. In this case, the owner might be
the AI system itself. Section 201(a) of the Copyright Act states that
“[c]opyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the
author[.]” 125 The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that, as a general
rule, “the author is the party who actually creates the work.”126
Scholars have also endorsed this position, arguing that the AI system

Intelligence, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 113 (1984); Antonio A. Martino, Artificial
Intelligence and Law, 2 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 154 (1994); L. Thorne McCarty,
Reflections on Taxman: An Experiment in Artificial Intelligence and Legal
Reasoning, 90 HARV. L. REV. 837 (1977); Edwina L. Rissland, Artificial Intelligence
and Law: Stepping Stones to a Model of Legal Reasoning, 99 YALE L.J. 1957
(1990).
122. Michaela Georgina Lexer & Luisa Scarcella, The Effects of Artificial
Intelligence on Labor Markets – A Critical Analysis of Solution Models from a Tax
Law and Social Security Law Perspective (working manuscript) (on file with the
authors) (arguing that robots should pay taxes and describing the European practical
approach supporting this idea); see also Chris Weller, Bill Gates Says Robots That
Take Your Job Should Pay Taxes, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 17, 2017, 9:57 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/bill-gates-robots-pay-taxes-2017-2 [https://
perma.cc/J3DJ-PKKN] (describing an interview with Bill Gates where he argued
that robot tax could finance jobs taking care of elderly people or working with kids
in schools, for which needs are unmet and to which humans are particularly well
suited).
123. See generally HALLEVY, supra note 11 (developing a general and
legally sophisticated theory of the criminal liability for AI and robotics).
124. See, e.g., Mark Fischer, Are Copyrighted Works Only by and for
Humans? The Copyright Planet of the Apes and Robots, DUANE MORRIS BLOG (Aug.
18,
2014),
https://blogs.duanemorris.com/newmedialaw/2014/08/18/arecopyrighted-works-only-by-and-for-humans-the-copyright-planet-of-the-apes-androbots [https://perma.cc/C9Z5-X5AY] (arguing that the future of copyright may
someday be in the hands of non-humans).
125. See 17 U.S.C § 201(a) (2012) (ownership of copyright).
126. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737
(1989); see also Russ VerSteeg, Defining “Author” for Purposes of Copyright, 45
AM. U. L. REV. 1323, 1326 (1996).
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should be accountable for the outcome of its own actions or
omissions. 127
Ownership, however, might be a result of a commercial
contract and not of copyright laws. 128 This view of AI systems
ultimately considers the AI system to be the owner of its works.
Scholars, however, have criticized this view on the grounds that it is
an untenable proposition. 129 Moreover, the length of protection is
designed after the life of the creator.130 Moral rights, including the
entitlement of the author to credit as well as the author’s control over
changes and modifications to the work, remain unresolved when AI
systems generate works.
C. Behind Every Robot There Is a Person: Looking for the Human(s)
Behind the Machine
Arthur R. Miller said, “[B]ehind every robot there is a good
person.” 131 This phrase, which represents the traditional approach to
AI in the U.S. and Europe, supports the default view of programmers
as the creators entitled to ownership of the works created by the AI
systems they have programmed. 132 Under this view, ownership and

127. Abbott, supra note 93, at 1080 (arguing that computers are already
generating patentable subject matters qualifying as inventors and overtaking human
inventors as primary source of new discoveries and inventions and therefore, AI
should receive patent rights in their inventions).
128. Id. at 1115-17.
129. See Annemarie Bridy, Coding Creativity: Copyright and the Artificially
Intelligent Author, 5 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 26 (2012); Pamela Samuelson,
Allocating Ownership Rights in Computer-Generated Works, 47 U. PITT. L.
REV. 1185, 1226-28 (1985) (arguing that rights should accrue to the user of the
program as the best practical solution); Robert Yu, The Machine Author: What Level
of Copyright Is Appropriate for Fully Independent Computer-Generated Works?,
165 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1263-65 (the author suggests the contribution–rights
paradox: from a social policy standpoint, entitling the rights to independent
computer-generated works is wrong). But see Fischer, supra note 124 (arguing that
the future of copyright may someday be in the hands of non-humans).
130. See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is
an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 87-88 (1985).
131. Miller, supra note 54, at 1045.
132. See Robert C. Denicola, Ex Machina: Copyright Protection for
Computer-Generated Works, 69 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 251, 265, 271, 275 (2016)
(stating that a computer user who initiates the creation of computer-generated
expression should be recognized as the author and copyright owner of the resulting
work); John Frank Weaver, How Artificial Intelligence Might Monetize Fan Fiction,
SLATE (Dec. 10, 2013, 11:33 AM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/
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accountability for works generated by AI systems are given to the
creators of the AI systems. 133 According to this view, the ownership
of works generated by AI systems and, hence, the accountability for
these works “belong” to the humans (and the entities working on
their behalf) involved in the process of developing the AI systems.
The human behind the program—usually the programmer—has
become an important figure in other fields of law that involve harm
and damages resulting from AI systems, such as criminal law or tort
law. 134
This traditional approach is reflected in various European
Union laws. For example, the British Copyright, Designs, and
Patents Act of 1988 takes the approach that copyright protection is
proper for persons responsible for a computer’s creation. 135 The Act
states: “In this Part ‘author’, in relation to a work, means the person
who creates it.” 136 Even the broader approach regarding computers
generating artworks is looking for the person behind the creation
process. Article 9(3) of the Act says: “(3) In the case of a literary,
dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer-generated, the
author shall be taken to be the person by whom the arrangements
necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken.” 137
The U.S. also holds this attitude, as reflected by the National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU), which was created to advise Congress on whether thenemerging technologies necessitated a change in copyright laws. 138
CONTU concluded that computers were, at least at that time, merely
tools for facilitating human creativity. 139 According to this approach,

12/10/ai_intellectual_property_rights_how_artificial_intelligence_might_monetize.h
tml [https://perma.cc/Z2D4-YN7K].
133. See Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 38, at 6, 18 (discussing inventions
being produced by AI systems).
134. See David C. Vladeck, Machines Without Principals: Liability Rules
and Artificial Intelligence, 89 WASH. L. REV. 117, 120-29 (2014); see also O’Brien
v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., No. 10 C 3005, 2011 WL 3040479, at *1, *3 (N.D. Ill.
July 25, 2011) (granting summary judgment to surgical robot’s manufacturer).
135. See Copyright, Designs & Patents Act 1988, c. 48, §§ 3, 9 (Eng.).
136. Id. § 9(1).
137. Id. § 9(3).
138. U.S., FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 3, 4 (1978), http://www.digital-lawonline.info/CONTU/PDF/index.html [https://perma.cc/A5GC-446C] [hereinafter
CONTU FINAL REPORT].
139. See id. at 45.
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The computer, like [the] camera or [] typewriter, is an inert instrument,
capable of functioning only when activated either directly or indirectly by
a human . . . [and] affects the copyright status of a resultant work no more
than the employment of a still or motion-picture camera, a tape recorder,
or typewriter. 140

Entities, such as employers and firms, are thus entitled to copyright
ownership as the transferees of those programmers. 141
This Article criticizes this traditional approach and calls on
policymakers to revisit copyright laws in light of already-existing
advanced technology and the latest developments in AI systems. 142 I
argue that, inevitably, current copyright law will not be able to cope
with AI systems’ productivity and creativity. 143 One reason is that too
many stakeholders are involved in the process of creating the AI
system itself, with no one acting as the main contributor. 144 This
point of view holds the contributors involved in the process as
owners of the AI system, and thus the ones responsible for works
generated by the AI system. 145
1. Who Could the Owner Be?
The candidates for ownership of, and subsequent accountability
for, AI works vary from one case to another. 146 However, entitlement
to these rights depends on each candidate’s direct or indirect
contributions to the AI system. 147 I claim that due to the multi-player
model, most of the time, the candidates who are involved in the
development and manufacture of the AI system do not meet the
threshold of authorship. 148 The programming and algorithms used by
robots and AI systems may be the work of many hands and may
employ generative technologies that allow innovation at multiple
140. Id. at 44-45.
141. Copyright Ownership: Who Owns What?, supra note 10.
142. See Fischer, supra note 124 (noting that non-human systems will
created copyrightable works).
143. See id.
144. See Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 38, at 20 (suggesting that
multiple stakeholders in inventions created by AI systems disrupts the traditional
patent process because there is no single inventor).
145. See id. (discussing inventions being produced by AI systems).
146. See id. (discussing ownership in the context of responsibility for
infringement).
147. See id. In the case of The Next Rembrandt, one entity included all the
players.
148. See id. (describing the multi-player model in regard to AI systems
generating inventions).
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layers. 149 These features of robotics and AI enhance unpredictability
and complicate causal responsibility for what robots and AI systems
do. 150 In addition to the AI system software programmers, there are
(too) many players and stakeholders that contribute to the process of
creating, designing, developing and producing the AI systems
themselves, but not the product autonomously produced by the AI
systems. Among others are the data suppliers, trainers, feedback
suppliers, holders of the AI system, system operators, employers or
investors, the public, and the government. The large number of
players significantly weakens each player’s individual contribution
and thus the bond between the software programmers and the
products produced by the AI systems. There are many options for
who should own the works created by AI systems and, indeed, one
role may overlap with another. The following discussion will focus
on some of these players.
First, there are the programmers of the AI system. Second,
there are the trainers or the data providers, who may be among the
most important figures shaping the final functions of the AI systems.
Third, there are the feedback providers, or individuals whose task is
to provide the AI system with a signal that allows it to distinguish
right from wrong and sometimes to select the best result from many
random, meaningless results. 151 Fourth, there is the AI system’s
owner, whether that system is hardware or software. The owner
might be the corporation, as the owner of the hardware (robot) or the
software, or it might be the buyer of the AI systems (or robots).
Fifth, there is the operator of the AI system, or the person who
activates the system and enables its creation (although, it should be
noted, some advanced AI systems can operate by themselves without
a human operator). 152 If one applies a practical approach, the operator
could also be the manufacturer.153 Sixth, there is the buyer of the

149. See Balkin, supra note 100, at 53 (noting that AI has innovation at
multiple layers).
150. See id. (discussing causal responsibility of AI based on multiple hands
working on programming and algorithms).
151. See Abbott, supra note 93, at 1082 (arguing “a computer’s owner
should be the default assignee of any invention, both because this is most consistent
with the rules governing ownership of property, and because it would most
incentivize innovation”); Weeks, supra note 30, at 93.
152. See Samuelson, supra note 129, at 1205 (discussing the role of the
programmer and the programmer’s claims to ownership).
153. See generally RICHARD T. WATSON, INFORMATION SYSTEMS (2012)
(explaining the roles of manufacturers in AI systems).
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product. 154 Seventh, the government or governmental entities could
be entitled to ownership of products as a default or as a
representative of the public. Eighth, the public could also be one of
the candidates for ownership in cases of public domain policy. 155
Furthermore, different paradigms of ownership can exist regarding
the suggested owners of works created by AI systems. In regard to
these options, ownership could be sole ownership by one player or
co-ownership by multiple stakeholders.
I argue that none of the players are entitled to ownership of the
works generated by AI systems nor are they accountable for these
works. Because of the features of AI systems—creative,
autonomous, unpredictable, and evolving—none of the players can
directly claim ownership and accountability of the works generated
by AI systems. Furthermore, there are too many players involved in
the process, and none of the players are the main contributor to the
creation of the work. For example, although data and feedback
providers are crucial to the process, they cannot be considered as
owners because they are not authors. Thus, only one figure—the
programmer—remains as a candidate for ownership and
accountability. 156
2. Distinguishing Between the Rights over Artificial
Intelligence Software; the Rights of Works Produced by
Automated AI Systems; and the Rights of Programmers
For traditional artworks, the creators (or, in some cases, their
employers or main contractors) are entitled to copyright over the
artworks they produce, subject to several conditions.157 As discussed
above, developing the next generation of creative AI systems
involves many participants, including software programmers and the
154. See Samuelson, supra note 129, at 1207-08.
155. See Muzdalifah Faried Bakry & Zhilang He, Autonomous Creation –
Creation by Robots: Who Owns the IP Rights?, MAASTRICHT U. (Mar. 5, 2015),
https://law.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ipkm/autonomous-creation-creation-by-robotswho-owns-the-ip-rights [https://perma.cc/2YCC-RPER] (arguing that artificial
intelligence belongs in the public domain); Natasha Lomas, We Need To Talk About
AI and Access to Publicly Funded Data-Sets, TECHCRUNCH (July 9, 2016),
https://techcrunch.com/2016/07/09/we-need-to-talk-about-ai-and-access-to-publiclyfunded-data-sets/ [https://perma.cc/G7KZ-97CN] (explaining public domain data on
Google).
156. See Samuelson, supra note 129, at 1205 (discussing the role of the
programmer and the programmer’s claims to ownership).
157. See Copyright Ownership: Who Owns What?, supra note 10.
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companies for which they are working or those who commissioned
the algorithm that generated the work, trainers that provide the data,
and many other contributors. 158 The work itself, however, might be
created digitally by an AI system embedded in a computer. I argue
that the programmers of the software may be entitled to the copyright
of the program, but may not necessarily have the rights for future
products created by the AI system. I support this claim both
conceptually and legally.
Conceptually, I argue that AI systems reflect a discipline
focused on three inter-related components that are similar to the
“human” traits of intelligence. First, unlike traditional software, the
similarities and interconnections that the AI systems identify or find,
process, remember, use, and implement may, in many cases, be
unknown to the programmer. Second, in contrast to fixed and framed
software, the AI system evolves and develops as a result of new
input and new results. Third, the AI system’s works are significantly
unpredictable because the system constantly and automatically
evolves through its experiences.159 In short, because of their
intelligence components, AI systems are not only more accurate, of
higher quality, and faster at processing details, but are also capable
of creating unpredictable, original, and creative artworks and other
products—all of which are unknown to their programmers.
Therefore, these works created by AI systems could have been
copyrightable under U.S. copyright laws.160
Legally, the rights of an AI software program and the rights of
artworks can be distinguished from one another. Software is usually
protected not only by copyright laws, but also by the Constitution of
the United States, 161 which grants exclusive rights to “Authors and
Inventors” in their respective “Writings and Discoveries.” 162
However, the discourse about software ownership is distinct from the
question of ownership of products (and services) produced by AI
systems. One question that remains is whether the works produced
by AI systems should or could be entitled to copyright protection.
Can AI-generated works be regarded as proper “works of
authorship” pursuant to § 102 of the Copyright Act by virtue of AI’s
158. See supra Part I (listing the AI participants).
159. See, e.g., Bridy, supra note 129, at 20 (explaining requirements for
copyrighting); see also supra note 66.
160. See, e.g., Bridy, supra note 129, at 20 (explaining requirements for
copyrighting).
161. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
162. See id.
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sufficient nexus to human creativity? 163 Should this protection (if it
does exist) also be applied to inventions produced by AI systems? 164
On the one hand, I do not challenge the programmers’ entitlement to
copyright ownership in the software they develop, but on the other
hand, I argue that the entitlement to the software does not
automatically result in ownership over the products created by AI
systems. 165 I further conclude that the software programmers are not
the owners of the works produced by AI systems, just as the owner
of a brush or a camera does not hold the rights over the painting or
the photo produced by those objects.
The distinction between programming the AI software itself
and authoring the works the automated AI machine creates can be
better understood by thinking about a piano and the author of the
melodies created by using the piano. Imagine a melody that is
created by Z playing a piano that was programed and designed by A,
manufactured by B, and owned by C. Is the piano (or the ownership
of the piano) as the musical instrument, serving as the platform for
the creation, relevant to the question of ownership of the melody? 166 I
argue that neither the person who produced (or invented) the piano
nor the factory that produced it are the owners of the melody created
by a third entity (whether a human or an AI system).
Another relevant example would be the well-known selfie
taken by a monkey with someone else’s camera.167 In this example, a
monkey on the Indonesian island of Sulawesi took a photograph
using a camera owned by David Slater, a nature photographer.168 But
163. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990).
164. See § 107 (under Copyright’s “fair use” doctrine, others can reproduce
the copyrighted inventions for “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . .
scholarship, or research”); Thomas Caswell & Kimberly Van Amburg, Copyright
Protection on the Internet, in E-COPYRIGHT LAW HANDBOOK 7-1, 7-8 (Laura Lee
Stapleton ed., 2003) (arguing that all who independently create inventions might be
entitled to patent rights in order to protect it); Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability
of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959, 1015-16 (1986).
165. See RICHARD STIM, GETTING PERMISSION 194 (6th ed. 2016); see also
Copyright Ownership: Who Owns What?, supra note 10.
166. But see Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against
Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related
Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1148 (1990) (arguing that the role of the
software programmer is crucial).
167. Camila Domonoske, Monkey Can’t Own Copyright to His Selfie,
Federal Judge Says, NPR (Jan. 7, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/01/07/462245189/federal-judge-says-monkey-cant-own-copyright-to-hisselfie [https://perma.cc/5N7J-YKZ5].
168. See id.
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Slater didn’t trip the shutter—the monkey did. 169 The People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) filed a lawsuit on behalf of the
monkey, arguing that Naruto, the monkey, owns the copyright,
which PETA offered to administer on the monkey’s behalf.170 Since
the dispute began, “[t]he U.S. Copyright Office . . . has specifically
listed a photograph taken by a monkey as an example of an item
that cannot be copyrighted. Slater, meanwhile, has a British
copyright for the photo, which he argues should be honored
worldwide.” 171 He has asked the U.S. court to dismiss PETA’s
claim. 172 “Imagining a monkey as the copyright ‘author’ in Title 17
of the United States Code is a farcical journey Dr. Seuss might have
written,” according to Slater’s lawyer. 173
I argue that the producer or the seller of the instrument that
served as the platform for producing new works (i.e., the camera,
piano, or paintbrush)—like the software programmers or the
companies in charge of producing the platform—are unsuitable
candidates for being the creators or stakeholders of the works
generated by the platform. 174 The owner of the work is the entity that
generated the work. I argue that the rights to the AI systems’
algorithms, which can be owned by the human creator, are distinct
from the rights to the artworks the systems produce.
The code itself will have copyright protection. One could make
the claim that the output generated from the computer program is a
derivative work product of the underlying copyrighted program,
which may also provide copyright protection to whomever holds a
copyright in the algorithm. Thus, the holder of the copyright for the
algorithm would hold the copyright for the output too.175 However, in
1973, the Supreme Court interpreted the authorship requirement of
the Copyright Act to include “any physical rendering of the fruits of
169. See id.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. Id. (describing how, according to Slater’s lawyer, “[t]he only pertinent
fact in this case is that Plaintiff is a monkey suing for copyright infringement”).
173. Id.
174. See Naruto v. Slater, No. 15-cv-04324-WHO, 2016 WL 362231, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2016); Sarah Jeong, Judge Gives Monkey Second Chance to Sue
for Copyright Infringement, MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 1, 2016, 3:40 PM),
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/judge-gives-monkey-second-chance-to-sue-forcopyright-infringement [https://perma.cc/AG8N-DPMY] (discussing the judge’s
decision to give PETA leave to amend the complaint and try again to get damages
from Slater).
175. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.” 176 The Court concluded that,
in most cases, a computer requires a significant amount of input from
a human user in order to generate artistic output. 177
I argue that when the computer produces most of the output
independently and creatively, it is less likely that the output might be
considered to be the original source of the work and not as derivative
work. I do not oppose the programmer’s entitlement to ownership of
the AI system itself. However, I do contest the human behind the
machine’s point of view and the idea that this entitlement
automatically results in the programmer owning the products and
processes created by the AI system. 178 I claim that my conclusion
influences other cases beyond the intellectual property arena.179 This
brings me to another scenario targeting the AI system itself as being
responsible for its own works.
3. Other Possible Accountable Entities
In other legal regimes, scholars have suggested strict liability as
a solution for addressing the damages caused by AI systems, without
blaming either the AI system or its programmers. 180 Strict liability is
often employed when it would be too complicated to prove guilt,
negligence, or a causal link between the defendant’s failure to
exercise due care and the damages that occurred.181 I argue that, due
to the autonomous, creative, and unpredictable nature of AI systems,
using the traditional strict liability rule on individuals would be
unjust and inefficient.
Another option is to target the government or governmental
body as being accountable. 182 In some fields, such as international
176. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (emphasis added).
177. See id.
178. See infra Section II.C (discussing the human behind the machine point
of view and why this Article is critical of it).
179. See infra Subsection II.C.3 (discussing accountability implications of
the idea that an AI creator does not necessarily own the AI’s output).
180. See Vladeck, supra note 134, at 146.
181. See, e.g., id. (“My proposal is to construct a system of strict liability,
completely uncoupled from notions of fault for this select group of cases. A strict
liability regime cannot be based here on the argument that the vehicles are ‘ultrahazardous’ or ‘unreasonably risky’ for the simple reason that diver-less vehicles are
likely to be far less hazardous or risky than the products they replace.”). See also
Crootof, supra note 11, at 1394-95 (arguing that autonomous weapons are designed
to kill and their independent actions break the chain of causality, thereby making the
strict liability rule applicable).
182. See Scherer, supra note 48, at 394.
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law and autonomous weapons, the state is in the best position, at a
practical level, to ensure compliance with the law (e.g., that
autonomous weapons systems are designed and employed in
compliance with international law).183 States also have deep enough
pockets to pay damages to the victims, in addition to being involved
in developing, purchasing and using AI systems. 184 According to the
proposed model, states as employers or users would bear
responsibility for AI systems not because they are states per se, but
rather for the reasons mentioned above, due to their status as users.185
I argue that, at the national level, unlike the international level,
responsibility could be forced. There may also be third party
accountability. 186 In these solutions, accountability is not necessarily
connected to ownership because the works generated by AI systems
can be public domain, and copyrights laws may thus not be
applicable at all.187
I think that, under the copyright regime, these solutions do not
efficiently serve the goal of imposing accountability on the player
who should—along with enjoying the benefits of using AI systems—
also take responsibility for such systems. I have discussed two
alternative points of view. 188 First, the AI systems themselves could
be the owners and the ones responsible for their works. 189 Second,
the humans behind the machine (i.e., those involved in the process of
developing the AI systems) could be the owners and the ones
responsible for works generated by AI systems. 190 Since neither of
these perspectives seems applicable and justified to the questions of
ownership and accountability, I now turn to addressing these issues
under a theoretical justification framework.

183. See Crootof, supra note 11, at 1390.
184. See, e.g., Scherer, supra note 48, at 357, 394 (“This article will advance
the discussion regarding the feasibility and pitfalls of government regulation of AI
by examining these issues and explaining why there are, nevertheless, some
potential paths to effective AI regulation.”). See also Crootof, supra note 11, at
1389-93 (arguing that states are reluctant to take responsibility regarding
autonomous weapons).
185. See Crootof, supra note 11, at 1390.
186. See, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 134, at 148.
187. Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 38, at 18-21 (suggesting that
inventions produced by AI systems will not be protected by the patent law).
188. See supra Part II.
189. See supra Section II.B.
190. See supra Section II.C.
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III. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS
Many intuitively feel that AI systems, sophisticated robots, and
machines should not be able to have rights and duties; nor should
they hold copyrights. This intuition has its roots in strong theoretical
and legal arguments. 191 The following discussion will explain the
difficulties of seeing AI systems as totally independent from human
control. The discourse concerning the justifications for intellectual
property focuses on three main substantive theories: law and
economics, which examines intellectual property rules according to
their cumulative efficiency and ability to promote total welfare;
personality theory, which focuses on the personality of the creators;
and Lockean labor theory, which justifies the property interest as the
fruits of the creator’s labor. 192 Today, U.S. intellectual property law
is based primarily on the law and economics utilitarianism
approach 193 and, in part, John Locke’s theory of labor.194 By contrast,
the civil law approach to copyright protection justifies property
rights by the importance of the creators’ personality in the works
(personality approach), as well as by the ownership of the fruits
stemming from the person’s body and soul (Locke’s approach or
labor approach). 195

191. See Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, The Hidden Though Flourishing
Justification of Intellectual Property Laws: Distributive Justice, National Versus
International Approaches, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L.R. 1, 8-9 (2017).
192. See id. at 4-9 (describing the three major approaches to theoretical
justifications to intellectual property laws and arguing that distributive justice
theory, although discussed by some scholars, is wrongfully considered to be neither
a substantial nor a major justification of intellectual property; it is rather seen as an
exception or postscript to the mainstream theoretical justifications). See also
William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 169-75 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001)
(describing various theories underlying intellectual property); Justin Hughes, The
Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 288-89 (1988) (discussing the
different justifications to intellectual property laws).
193. DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 50 (3d ed. 2004)
(“[T]he predominant justification for American intellectual property law has been
. . . utilitarianism.”).
194. Peter M. Kohlhepp, When the Invention Is an Inventor: Revitalizing
Patentable Subject Matter to Exclude Unpredictable Processes, 93 MINN. L. REV.
779, 781-82 (2008).
195. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98
VA. L. REV. 1745, 1746 (2012) (discussing the personality and labor approach to
intellectual property); Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 34, at 118.
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A. Law & Economics
The U.S. system of copyright laws was established to protect
original authors and creators by giving them exclusive rights and
control over the works they generate.196 The U.S. Constitution grants
Congress the power “To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 197 The
main justification for establishing a copyright regime—giving
stakeholders property rights, which are broader than the rights
established by the contract regime—is based on the theory of law
and economics. In short, providing stakeholders property rights
promotes the creation of useful art. 198 This, in turn, motivates the
creators (or their transferees) to create, expose, develop, and
distribute their works, enriching the total welfare of the public.199 The
Copyright Clause, by securing exclusive rights to authors and
inventors, aims to “promote the . . . science and the useful Arts.” 200
This Section will focus on copyright law’s purpose of
promoting the creation of artistic works by establishing an incentive
structure through which authors are given exclusive control over the
copyright works. 201 Often, however, as a result of a special contract
or relationship with the author or creator, other entities are entitled to
the copyrights as direct transferees of the actual human creator. 202
Unlike humans, AI systems do not need incentives to create
artworks. 203 It’s true that programmers need to be incentivized to
196. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics
Approach, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 57, 60 (2005) (explaining how the society made an
agreement with the authors to grant them exclusive rights for limited duration and
then the rights become public domain).
200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
201. See Posner, supra note 199, at 57; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2017)
(“Exclusive rights in copyrighted works.”); William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326
(1989).
202. SHLOMIT YANISKY-RAVID, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
WORKPLACE: THEORETICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (2013) (explaining the
incentives to create as being part of the law and economics justification as well as
other justifications for intellectual property); Pamela Samuelson, Mapping the
Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147,
156 (2003).
203. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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create and develop advanced, automated AI systems, but
programmers, or the entities for which they are working, do hold
copyrights over the software. 204 Once we understand the nature of
incentives, we understand that they are nevertheless needed to (1)
promote the development of AI systems’ programming and (2)
encourage entities to control the functions of AI systems and to take
responsibility for their outcomes. In these cases, ownership might be
the most efficient tool for gaining this incentive. 205
However, we do not need to incentivize robots or AI systems to
function. Incentivizing AI systems to generate works they are
already internally programed to create is pointless. My argument is
rooted in understanding that automated AI systems not only evolve
independently after the program has been completed, but also evolve
in ways that are unpredictable, even to the human programmers who
created them. This conclusion is further drawn from the fact that the
connection and similarities that AI systems draw are neither made
nor known to the programmers. 206 We can compare this system to
human perception via the human brain. The programmers
implemented or created the neurons and synapses, but not the
electronic messages that will be created in the future and their
products. 207 The programmers thus create the systems, but cannot
predict the works themselves. 208 Consequently, the creativity of an
AI system is not a result of the creativity of the programmers; at the
very least, the causal relationship is not close enough to justify
ownership (as a tool to incentivize a specific function) in the new
works generated by AI machines. 209 The human programmer is only
ancillary to the creation of the artworks.

204. See Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 38, at 15.
205. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SCIENCE, 1243, 1243-48
(1968) (arguing that ownership is efficient to retain property).
206. See Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 38, at 2.
207. Julien Vitay, Helge Ü. Dinkelbach & Fred H. Hamker, ANNarchy: A
Code Generation Approach to Neural Simulations on Parallel Hardware,
FRONTIERS NEUROINFORMATICS, July 31, 2015, at 1 (discussing a notable exception,
the Brian simulator, “which allows the user to completely define the neuron and
synapse models using a simple mathematical description of the corresponding
equations [and] uses a code generation approach to transform these descriptions into
executable code, [which in turn] allow[s] the user to implement any kind of neuron
or synapse model”).
208. JAMES GLEICK, WHAT JUST HAPPENED: A CHRONICLE FROM THE
INFORMATION FRONTIER 19 (2002).
209. See Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 38, at 18-19.
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In addition, and as mentioned above, programmers are already
incentivized to make creative AI systems because they receive
copyright protection for the program itself. 210 Furthermore, because
copyright protection does not exist in a vacuum, it must be balanced
against competing rights. It is important that the legal regime
incentivizes the right people and entities, and ultimately promotes
behavior that will increase total welfare.211 The legal regime has
succeeded if programmers who create AI systems are incentivized to
do so either through intellectual property protection or patent
protection for the machine, copyright protection for its computer
code, or both. But if we understand that these legal tools incentivize
the AI system or the programmers to create works of authorship,
when they are not in fact doing so, the system is failing because it is
inefficient. It should be obvious that machines need no incentive to
work. In other words, assuming that machines capable of creating
unique art already exist, in all likelihood there would be no need to
incentivize the creation of these works. Providing AI systems with
wires, electronic devices, Internet connection, and materials should
be enough.
If, as the law and economics approach contends, copyright is
meant to be an incentive structure, and machines do not need to be
incentivized to create, then copyrighting the machines’ works
provides no benefit but does hamper the public’s ability to enjoy the
work. 212 Thus, giving AI systems rights to the works they create
would seemingly operate to take them out of the sphere of copyright
altogether. 213 Indeed, the public’s or the end-users’ interest in
appreciating and enjoying works of art should be balanced against
the private interest in maintaining exclusive, monopolistic control. 214
Since human creators need to be incentivized to create, copyright
used to be the optimal state of affairs for both parties because,
without it, much fewer works of art would be created for the public
210. See id. at 15.
211. Tiina Kautio et al., Assessing the Operation of Copyright and Related
Rights Systems, CUPORE (2016), http://www.cupore.fi/en/research/previousresearches/assessing-the-operation-of-copyright-and-related-rights-systems-14250714122016 [https://perma.cc/4BM3-SNCA].
212. See Yanisky-Ravid & Velez-Hernandez, supra note 32, at 7; see also
Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 38, at 29-30 (arguing that patent laws are not
applicable in the 3A era of AI).
213. See Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note 38, at 8.
214. See Julius Cohen, The Anti-Trust Acts and “Monopolistic
Competition”: A Case Study, 24 CORNELL L. REV. 80 (1938).
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to enjoy. 215 But in the non-hypothetical future in which machines can
create pleasing works of art without limits, I argue that the existing
balance would be thrown off. In the case of AI systems, I argue,
there wouldn’t be any risk of a lack of artistic creation even if
copyright law did not exist to protect such creations. 216 Such a reality
could, furthermore, pose an existential threat to the entire copyright
regime. 217
Assuming that many people consume works of authorship for
their artistic merit, I argue it is likely that machine-produced works
could not serve as a perfect replacement for human-authored works.
Instead, the market for human-authored works of art would coexist
with a market for works “authored” by machines.218 Since human
artists would still need to be compensated, copyright law would
persist, at least until machines capable of imparting deeper meaning
to their work were created (if such a thing is indeed possible).219 In
addition to being more likely in the near future, this model is perhaps
more palatable to policymakers and the general public.
Thus, denying copyright protection for works of authorship
created by machines is unlikely to greatly change the existing
system. However, as the world becomes more electronically based
and cyber-focused (a trend we can already observe), it won’t take
long until machines, using AI systems, can copy any artistic work
precisely (including the signature). 220 This will ultimately destroy the

215. See Jared Green, Why Public Art Is Important, DIRT (Oct. 15, 2012),
https://dirt.asla.org/2012/10/15/why-public-art-is-important [https://perma.cc/T7NXE8PA].
216. See Moral Rights, ARTS L. CTR. AUSTL., http://www.artslaw.com.au/
info-sheets/info-sheet/moral-rights [https://perma.cc/8YNQ-67PA] (last visited Jan.
15, 2018). Moral rights protect the personal relationship between a creator and his or
her work even if the creator no longer owns the work or the copyright in the work.
Moral rights concern the creator’s right to be properly attributed or credited and the
protection of his or her work from derogatory treatment. See id.
217. See Yanisky-Ravid & Velez-Hernandez, supra note 32, at 19. See
generally Tang, supra note 34 (explaining how the involvement of digital tools in
creation leads to seeing moral right as trademark).
218. See Samuelson, supra note 129; see also Samuelson, supra note 166, at
1148 (arguing that the role of the software programmer is crucial).
219. See generally Artificial Intelligence – Overview, TUTORIALSPOINT,
https://www.tutorialspoint.com/artificial_intelligence/pdf/artificial_intelligence_ove
rview.pdf [https://perma.cc/5M4P-WVZB] (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
220. See e.g., Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Kenneth S. Kwan, 3D Printing the
Road Ahead: The Digitization of Products when Public Safety Meets Intellectual
Property Rights—A New Model, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 921, 923-24 (2017).
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incentive to produce these works of art, which, in turn, will
eventually destroy the copyright regime. 221
One possibility is that the AI systems might require electronic
licenses, drawn up by electronic agreements,222 to use their products,
as well as electronic contracts creating electronic sanctions for
breaching the license (e.g., electronically terminating the infringing
works). 223 However, these methods would not need copyright laws,
as the theoretical rights and their enforcement would no longer use
the traditional court system. 224 Although AI systems might be able to
detect infringements easier and in more efficient ways, implementing
copyright laws for the purpose of excluding other entities is not the
right solution. Doing so would most likely lead to the loss of control
and lack of accountability and responsibility that humans have over
property and intellectual property rights. 225
The thought of machines taking over and nullifying copyright
law is not just far-fetched; it would also require a tremendous,
uncomfortable shift in the legal landscape. After confronting the
challenges posed by advanced technology and AI systems that
autonomously generate works, it would be a stretch—even in the
existing case of a sophisticated neural network AI capable of
learning and creating independently—to imagine an AI system that
could understand and use the copyright regime as its incentive.
Furthermore, it seems non-feasible that AI systems will be capable in
the near future of suing in court for ownership rights. 226 I contend
that, while preparing and formulating future laws, although
theoretically and digitally feasible, it is not likely that AI systems
will acquire ownership and sell or give licenses to use their products
in the near future. I further claim that even when AI systems will be
qualified to possess their own rights and duties, a more theoretically

221. See id. at 927.
222. See Scholz, supra note 17, at 102.
223. See id. at 110.
224. See id. at 120-21.
225. Yanisky-Ravid & Kwan, supra note 220, at 924 (discussing the threat
and hazards of 3D printings).
226. The decision earlier this month in the case of Halo v. Pulse will give
owners of U.S. patents a greater likelihood of being awarded enhanced damages. See
Frederic Henschel & Kevin M. Littman, U.S. Supreme Court Strengthens Patents
(for a Change), SCIENCE BUS. (June 23, 2016), http://sciencebusiness.net/news/
79833/US-Supreme-Court-strengthens-patents-(for-a-change) [https://perma.cc/
UCX3-3WUP] (arguing this will raise the value of patents and increase the incentive
to sue for infringement).
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justified solution will be to legally impose these rights and duties on
other parties as the users.
Instead, I would like to suggest an alternative model that, on
the one hand, acknowledges and reflects the perception of the 3A era
of automated, autonomous, and advanced AI systems, and, on the
other hand, imposes control and accountability on traditional legal
entities. This model would consider AI systems as employees (or
contractors) that work for the humans or firms that legally operate
them. This model is similar to the notion of an “employed creator”
under the WMFH doctrine—i.e., an employee who creates new
works in the scope of their employment.
The owner of a copyright has the exclusive right and may
authorize others to reproduce the work, prepare derivative works
based on the work, distribute copies of the work, or show the work
publicly. Having those rights also means that the copyright holder
has the right to stop others from infringing on those rights. The
problem for a non-human, such as an AI system, is that it is unable to
enforce those rights. Although it is theoretically feasible, a computer
cannot sue another computer in court over the unauthorized copying
of its work. Furthermore, a computer is incapable of transferring
those rights to others who might be able to sue on its behalf. Even
from a public policy perspective, the main purpose of granting
copyright protection is to stimulate artistic creation by ensuring that
nobody can steal the fruits of an artist’s labor, making it less risky to
create original works of authorship. Since computers cannot be
“encouraged” to create new works, the usual public policy
justifications underlying copyright law are inapplicable.
Some would argue that the WMFH model isn’t any different
from a film director and a cameraman taking particular shots. The
cameraman is a creative person, but the director will hold the right to
the shot. AI systems act similarly to the creative cameraman. In fact,
in Goldstein v. California, the Supreme Court interpreted the
authorship requirement to include “any physical rendering of the
fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.” 227 The Court
reasoned that, in most cases, in order for a computer to generate any
kind of artistic work, it would require significant input from an
author or user. 228 Another way to think about it is this: when an artist
uses Adobe Illustrator to create a unique graphic design, nobody can
deny that the designs were the product of the designer’s creative
227.
228.

412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) (emphasis added).
See id.
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mind. However, creating a song by pressing a button on a random
number music generator isn’t going to receive copyright protection
on the resulting musical composition. But if the user provides some
input that affects the song being generated, such as choosing the
instruments, deciding on the key or tempo, or choosing a musical
style for the composition, then the final musical composition may be
the result of creative input and therefore copyrightable.
The law and economics theory, discussed above, is the
dominant justification for copyright protection in Anglo-American
law. 229 However, in continental Europe, where copyright protection
originated with an eye towards protecting great, independent artists,
a different approach prevails, as addressed in the next Section.
B. Personality and Labor Theoretical Justifications
In civil law jurisdictions, the dominant justifications for
copyright are the personality and labor Lockean theories.230 The
personality theory posits that copyright protection is a right that
accrues to the author in possession, reflection, and development of
his personality on the assets.231 It recognizes and appreciates the
author’s accomplishments and the element of his or her personality
and individuality that the work contains, rather than simply an
incentive to create more. 232 A related justification is the labor theory,
which stipulates that copyright protection exists due to the hard work
and dedication that authors contribute to their works. 233 Just as AI
does not need to be incentivized, AI systems do not have any need
for recognition of the works reflecting their personality. 234
Nevertheless, I argue that copyright protection could still accrue to
the creators of such machines.
Developing AI systems capable of creating works of authorship
is a great accomplishment. Therefore, it may make sense to grant
229. See Posner, supra note 199.
230. See MARTIN SENFTLEBEN, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS, AND THE THREESTEP TEST: AN ANALYSIS OF THE THREE-STEP TEST IN INTERNATIONAL AND EC
COPYRIGHT LAW 8 (2004); Justin Hughes, The Personality Interest of Artists and
Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81, 83 (1998).
231. See Hughes, supra note 230, at 83.
232. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV.
957, 986 (1982) (arguing that the more personal one’s property is, the more
nonfungible and nontransferable it becomes); see also Yanisky-Ravid, supra note
191, at 9.
233. Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 191, at 4-5.
234. See supra Part III.
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programmers the copyrights of works created by AI systems to
recognize the magnitude of that accomplishment. Still, and even
more strongly than the analysis of the incentive structure endemic to
the law and economic theory, we have no other option than to
recognize that when a creator is a machine, robot, or AI system, the
personality theory and the labor theory are irrelevant. We therefore
cannot justify the existence of copyright laws when they are applied
to this new reality. Just as we do not need to incentivize
programmers to create works of authorship in which they do not
have any creative input, we do not need to recognize a programmer
for an artistic accomplishment that is not his or her own. Therefore,
there is little support for granting copyright protection to human
programmers for the works of their AI systems under this theory
either. However, when addressing the Work Made for Hire doctrine,
we can rely partially on the labor approach to the investment of the
firm in the works produced by the AI systems. 235
IV. THE MODEL OF AI—WORK MADE FOR HIRE (WMFH)
One major motivation for the proposed model is to unveil the
clandestine interests behind the phenomenon of AI systems.
Following Professor Jack Balkin, who has explored the “laws of
robotics” and the legal and policy principles that should govern how
human beings use robots, algorithms, and AI systems, 236 I claim that
we should view AI systems as working for the users, and hence the
users should bear accountability for the systems’ production, in
addition to the benefits thereof. Balkin argues that there exists a false
belief of a little person inside each robot or program who has either
good or bad intentions. 237 According to Balkin, the substitution
effect refers to the multiple effects on social power and social
relations that arise from the fact that robots, AI systems, and
algorithms act as substitutes for human beings and operate as
235. See, e.g., Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid & Amy Mittelman, Gender Biases in
Cyberspace: A Two-Stage Model, the New Arena of Wikipedia and Other Websites,
26 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 381, 391 (2016) (explaining that
investment into information technology can help establish a more free and
democratic reality); see also Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, “For a Mess of Pottage”:
Incentivizing Creative Employees Toward Improved Competitiveness, CORNELL
HUM.
RTS.
REV.
(2013),
http://www.cornellhrreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/05/Incentivizing-Creative-Shlomit-Yanisky-Ravid.pdf [https://
perma.cc/88MX-T8WM].
236. See Balkin, supra note 21, at 14.
237. See id. at 13-14.
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special-purpose people.238 For Balkin, the most important issues in
the laws of robotics require an understanding of how human beings
exercise power over other human beings mediated through new
technologies. 239 The “three laws of robotics” should therefore be laws
directed at human beings and human organizations, not at the robots
or AI systems. According to Professor Balkin, those basic laws that
regulate and control robots and AI systems include the following: (1)
operators of robots, algorithms, and AI systems are information
fiduciaries who have special duties of good faith and fair dealing
toward their end-users, clients, and customers; (2) privately owned
businesses who are not information fiduciaries nevertheless have
duties toward the general public.240 I further argue that identifying
the many players behind AI systems is the key factor for imposing
accountability for the works generated by AI systems. Following
Balkin’s argument, I propose a new model that might delegitimize
the use of new technologies as a means for both public and private
organizations to govern large populations. In order to unveil these
hidden powers, I propose a model that sees AI systems as
independent workers or employees of the users.
A. Rethinking the WMFH Legal Doctrine in the Case of AI Systems
The WMFH doctrine gives employers, or the individual
commissioning the work, the copyright in works of authorship
created by the employees or subcontractors. 241 The WMFH rule is
thus an exception to the general principle of copyright ownership.
Usually, the copyright becomes the property of the author once the
creation meets the demands of the law. 242 However, if a work is made
238. See id. at 14.
239. See id. at 16.
240. See id. at 19-23 (arguing that those who use robots, algorithms, and AI
systems have a public duty to avoid creating nuisances. Thus, for example,
businesses may not leverage asymmetries of information, monitoring capacity, and
computational power to externalize the costs of their activities onto the general
public).
241. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201 (2010); Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v.
Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 746 (1989); Works Made For Hire, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF.,
https://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ09.pdf [https://perma.cc/PTA4-X44R] (last
visited Jan. 15, 2018).
242. § 102 (“Subject Matter of Copyright (a) Copyright protection subsists,
in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of
a machine or device. Works of authorship include the following categories: (1)
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for hire, the employer or the one who commissioned the work would
be considered the author, even if an employee or subcontractor
actually created the work. The employer could be a firm, an
organization, or an individual. 243
Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines a “work made for
hire” in two parts:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her
employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to
a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an
instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if
the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the
work shall be considered a work made for hire. 244

This section should be read together with Section 201 of the same
Act:
(a) Initial Ownership.
Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the author
or authors of the work. The authors of a joint work are coowners of
copyright in the work.
(b) Works Made for Hire.
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for
whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this
title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written
instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the
copyright. 245

The Supreme Court’s decision in Community for Creative NonViolence v. Reed addressed the “work made for hire” definition.246
literary works; (2) musical works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic
works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic
works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other
audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works. (b) In no case
does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in
such work.”).
243. See Works Made for Hire, supra note 241, at 2 (“If a work is made for
hire, the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is the initial
owner of the copyright unless both parties involved have signed a written agreement
to the contrary.”).
244. § 101.
245. § 201.
246. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 737.
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“The Court held that one must first ascertain whether a work was
prepared by an employee or an independent contractor.” 247 “If an
employee created the work . . . the work will generally be considered
a work made for hire.” 248 In this context, however, the term employee
differs from its common understanding. 249 “For copyright purposes,
‘employee’ means an employee under the general common law of
agency.” 250 “An independent contractor,” on the other hand, “is
someone who is not an employee under the general common law of
agency.” 251 “If an independent contractor created the work, and the
work was specially ordered or commissioned,” the second part of the
WMFH definition applies. 252 “A work created by an independent
contractor can be a work made for hire only if (a) it falls within one
of the nine categories of works listed . . . above, and (b) there is a
written agreement between the parties specifying that the work is a
work made for hire.” 253
To help determine who is an employee, the Court identified
factors that establish an “employer–employee” relationship, as
defined by agency law. 254 The factors fall into three broad categories:
(1) control by the employer over the work (i.e., the employer determines
how the work is done, has the work done at the employer’s location, and
provides the . . . means to create the work); (2) control by the employer
over the employee (i.e., the employer controls the employee’s [time] in
creating the work, has the right to have the employee perform other
assignments . . . or has the right to hire the employee’s assistants); and (3)
status and conduct of the employer (i.e., the employer is in business to
produce such works [or] provides the employee with benefits). 255

“These factors are not exhaustive[,] [and] [t]he Court left unclear
which of these factors must be present in order to establish the
employment relationship under the work-for-hire definition.” 256

247. See id. at 731; Works Made for Hire, supra note 241, at 2.
248. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 490 U.S. at 732; see also Works
Made for Hire, supra note 241, at 2.
249. See Works Made for Hire, supra note 241, at 2.
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751-52
(1989); see also Works Made for Hire, supra note 241, at 2.
256. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 201 (2012); Community for Creative NonViolence, 490 U.S. at 751-52.; Works Made for Hire, supra note 241, at 2.
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Examples of works made in an [employer–employee] relationship include:
[a] software program created by a staff programmer within the scope of
his or her duties at a software firm[;] [a] newspaper article written by a
staff journalist for publication in the newspaper that employs the journalist
. . . [;] [a] musical arrangement written for a music company by a salaried
arranger on the company’s staff[;] [and] [a] sound recording created by the
salaried staff engineers of a record company. 257

Why it is important to identify WMFH? There are important
consequences that stem from the WMFH doctrine, including that the
term and duration of copyright protection differ, there are no moral
rights, and the termination provisions of the law do not apply. 258
B. WMFH and Works Generated by AI Systems
This doctrine is an important and major exception to the
general rule that copyright protection properly rests with the one or
the many who actually created the work. 259 It is therefore important
for cases of AI systems generating works. 260 The Copyright Act
named the employer and main contractor as the authors of the work
even though they have not actually created the work. 261 The policy
rationale for this doctrine is to incentivize the employer or primary
contractor at whose instance, direction, use, commercial purposes or
risk the work is prepared, as well as to give them control over the
commercial force regarding the work. 262 The idea and the outcome is
that the employer or primary contractor, rather than the creator (who
is an employee or sub-contractor), has the responsibility for and the
accountability over the actions of the creator in regards to, inter alia,
257. See Works Made for Hire, supra note 241, at 2.
258. §§ 101, 106A, 302(a), 302(c), 304(a), 203(a). For example, WMFH
copyright protection of a work made for hire is ninety-five years from the date of
publication or 120 years from the date of creation, whichever expires first, whereas a
work not made for hire is ordinarily protected by copyright for the life of the author
plus seventy years. See id. § 302.
259. See § 201(a).
260. See Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the ‘Fuel of Interests’ from the ‘Fire of
Genius’: Law and the Employee-Inventor, 1830-1930, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127,
1131 (1998) (arguing that employees efficiently transfer their rights in future
products to their employers through their employment contracts).
261. See § 201(b).
262. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 746 (1989);
Fisk, supra note 260. For a critique of this approach, see Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid,
Rethinking Innovation and Productivity Within the Workplace Amidst Economic
Uncertainty, 24 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 143, 173-79 (2013)
(rethinking innovation by incentivizing employees), and Yanisky-Ravid, supra note
235, at 3.
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infringements of the law and harm caused by the work. 263 This rule
may be altered or changed by a contract among the relevant parties.
I claim that this doctrine seems to fit well conceptually with the
problem of works created by AI systems. Although the AI system
itself would be the proximate creator of the work, others, such as the
user of the AI system at whose instance the work is ultimately
created, will be entitled to ownership as well as accountability in
regard to the works. But in the case of AI systems, who is the
employer or main contractor? The answer may be complicated and
may vary according to different circumstances. In many cases, it will
be the user that operates and provides directions to the machine in
the form of instructing it what to paint, write about, etc. The answer
may also be the user that takes the financial risk of buying or hiring
the machine and supplying it with energy and materials in the hope
of producing a marketable final product. From a policy and practical
standpoint, it makes sense to incentivize people or firms as well as
other entities to use creative AI systems to create works of
authorship because doing so will most efficiently promote the
proliferation of the devices and the works they produce. 264
The justification for giving the entitlement of ownership to
economic entities is rooted in the incentive theory as well.265 This
legally sanctioned monopoly allows the users to use, sell, or
distribute the works more efficiently, as well as to be accountable for
avoiding infringements and counterfeits. 266 The latter is perhaps a
better argument for giving copyright protection in the works of
advanced, autonomous AI systems to their users. To avoid AI
systems getting out of control, we have to legally nominate the most
efficient entity to control them. The incentive for imposing property
accountability on the users as employers or main contractors and
seeing AI systems as employees or subcontractors is not just
intuitive, it is also justified by theoretical and practical reasoning.
The user can also be the owner of the AI system when the owner is
the more efficient entity for controlling these works.
263. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102 (2012); Fisk, supra note 260, at 1131.
264. See Yanisky-Ravid, supra note 235, at 3.
265. Kendra Cherry, The Incentive Theory of Motivation: Are Actions
Motivated by a Desire for Rewards, VERY WELL (May 9, 2016),
https://www.verywell.com/the-incentive-theory-of-motivation-2795382
[https://perma.cc/3JN7-P24S].
266. Paul Belleflamme, The Economics of Copyright Protection, IPDIGIT
(Oct.
2,
2013),
http://www.ipdigit.eu/2013/10/the-economics-of-copyrightprotection [https://perma.cc/MGQ3-6QNW].
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This model also solves the inherent problem of multiple players
being involved in the development of AI systems. The tragedy of
multiple stakeholders is that they can block the development and
commercial use of the AI system. 267 Moreover, the model would
encourage further investment in the AI industry and likely promote
science and technology, thus promoting the goals of the Constitution
and promoting total welfare. With respect to AI systems, the
innovation provided by this model does not just grant rights and
benefits, such as ownership of the products, it also imposes
responsibility and thus assists in solving the problem of the lack of
accountability for the outcomes of AI systems. This mechanism
might also contribute to the responsibility and accountability for the
use of AI systems in other regimes, such as criminal law and tort
law. One could argue that these fields are based on a different
justification and, therefore, are not influenced by the copyright
regime. However, I claim that, because AI systems are copyrightable
based on their software, it may be justified and useful to implement
this model within the intellectual property realm as it intersects with
other legal fields, such as tort and criminal law, that address the same
challenges, including lack of accountability for damages generated
by autonomous car accidents caused by AI systems.
Under this model, we see the AI systems as creative employees
or subcontractors (just like humans) working for these entities. The
model works for both firms and humans: The autonomous AI
system, just like WMFH-employed creators, is the creative author of
a work. When an AI system acts autonomously, it can be compared
to an independent contractor and thus be shielded under WMFH
doctrine.
C. The Legal Implications of the AI WMFH Model
Who owns the copyright in regard to the works generated by an
AI system? Who is responsible for any damage the works may
cause? Who would be the most efficient player in distributing and
selling the works? Take, for example, The Next Rembrandt project.
Unlike a traditional computer program, The Next Rembrandt project
had teams of people working for several years to bring it to the
public. What happens to those individuals? Do all of the people
involved with the project have copyright ownership of its artworks?
267. Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 621-24 (1998).
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Are they all, or perhaps only some of them, entitled to joint
copyright ownership? Trying to determine the scope of ownership
amongst the team members would be extremely difficult. In fact, this
multi-stakeholders challenge was one of the practical and theoretical
issues that led to the original WMFH doctrine.
On some level, the AI WMFH doctrine can solve this problem.
It holds that the person or entity that orders or initiates the work is
entitled to the copyright, instead of the authors themselves. Based on
this theory, before the AI system was generated, the employer or the
main contractor may be entitled to all of the rights. However, does
this mean that the employer or the main contractor, under certain
circumstances, is also entitled to the right over the paintings
generated by the AI system? If this were the case, for example, the
entity that operates The Next Rembrandt project, ING, would receive
the full copyright over the paintings being generated by the system,
as soon as certain legal requirements were met.268 Thus, it is possible
that there is a copyright in The Next Rembrandt and that the
copyright is held by ING. Copyright protection is only important if
ING wants to enforce it, and applying the WMFH doctrine in a case
like this would have some drawbacks.
D. The Drawbacks of Adopting the WMFH Model in Cases of AI
Systems
Many questions arise in implementing the existing WMFH
doctrine. Are the works generated by AI systems copyrightable in the
first place? If these works are not copyrightable, can the employer
hold copyright through the WMFH doctrine? What happens if the
works generated by AI systems are not included in the nine-item list
268. The requirements being: (1) A written agreement signed by both parties
(2) that specifically states that the work is a “work-made-for-hire” and (3) the work
must be one of these nine types: a contribution to a collective work, part of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work; a translation; a supplementary work; a
compilation; an instructional text; a test; material for a test; or an atlas. Generally, in
order for the WMFH doctrine to apply when many individuals are involved in
producing a work, the entity entitled to copyright ownership must sign a contract
with each team member attesting that each team member’s contribution is a work
made for hire. The type of work must also be included in the list of products covered
by the WMFH doctrine. An argument could be made that The Next Rembrandt
might fall under the category of “compilation,” or perhaps a “contribution to a
collective work.” Additionally, it is very likely that ING, with potential copyright
claims to the work, had to affirmatively relinquish any claims prior to starting work
on the project.

Generating Rembrandt

715

of the copyright law? What happens when autonomous AI systems
create a work outside the scope of “employment”? What would be
the legal outcome in another jurisdiction, such as France, where the
creative employees retain the rights themselves? What would be the
outcome when the AI system generates products or actions that are
not copyrightable?
The Supreme Court has suggested that the WMFH doctrine is
very limited in scope—namely, it applies only to instances where
Congress has expressed a clear and explicit intent to override section
102. 269 Therefore, implementing the doctrine would require new
legislation with a broader scope of the matters and the rights
involved. By comparison, denying copyright to works produced by
advanced AI systems would probably require judicial clarification, as
such a result is theoretically compatible with the current legal
framework.
Furthermore, the AI context is less germane to the Work Made
for Hire analysis than a corporation, like a publishing company or
record label. When addressing the works produced by AI systems,
there are no human creators behind such production.270 The
employed creators produce the protected works within the scope of
their employment. 271 These employees work for the employer mainly
for the purpose of creating a work, with major contributions,
guidelines, and involvement from the employer. 272 The policy
rationale for giving rights to these types of corporations is to justify
the (often large) upfront costs entailed in developing artistic talent
and slowly producing a work while balancing the needs of the artist
with the needs of the corporation’s marketing strategy. However, the
costs accruing to a user of creative AI would be much lower. For
example, while a record company needs to scout and find talent,
create a “brand” strategy for a musical act, allow the artist or artists
to write and record music over several months, operate a music
studio, and employ sound engineers to bring everything together in a
269. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 747
(1989).
270. See supra Section I.A.
271. Karthik Raman, Protecting Intellectual Property Rights Through
Information Policy, UBIQUITY (June 2004), http://ubiquity.acm.org/article.cfm?id=
1008537 [https://perma.cc/Z5PF-6BJ4].
272. Employment Relations Research Series 123, DEP’T BUS. INNOVATION &
SKILLS (Mar. 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/
attachment_data/file/128792/13-638-employer-perceptions-and-the-impact-ofemployment-regulation.pdf [https://perma.cc/ANR8-3K9L].
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finished song, the user of the kind of AI system discussed in this
Article needs only buy the machine and supply it with materials. The
machine can then create works non-stop, without needing to be
compensated. Because the costs of undertaking the activity are
relatively low, it may not make sense to create a new legal
framework just to incentivize owners of creative AI systems.
Therefore, some academics and practitioners argue that it might
make more sense to adopt the personhood and rights of AI systems
even if the “price” is simply refusing copyright protection.273
However, the model that I propose is broader than the WMFH
doctrine and establishes a spectrum that might include all works
produced by AI systems.
E. The Advantages of the Proposed AI WMFH Model
In this model, users are understood to be the owners of works
generated by AI systems. As such, they are also considered to be
responsible for such works. In this section, I discuss several benefits
of this model, especially when compared to the alternatives.
First, the model reflects an understanding of the human-like
features of AI systems, instead of ignoring them as current legal
regimes do when they look for the human behind the system. The
model refers to an AI system as both creative and independent and
imposes the same set of rules and principles that regulate creative
works produced by humans acting as self-contractors or during
employment by others.
Second, the model is justified by the law and economics theory,
which incentivizes the efficient use of the creative, autonomous AI
systems and enhances the commercial force of the works generated
by them.
Third, and most importantly, instead of implementing scenario
A or B, which would hold programmers and other players to be the
owners of the AI systems and entrust them with responsibility for the
works generated, this model solves the accountability gap. The AI
WMFH model is the best solution for the problem posed by the
accountability gap because it places responsibility on the users as
employers or main contractors of the AI systems. Seeing AI systems

273. See generally Cohen, supra note 2; Yanisky-Ravid & Liu, supra note
38 (suggesting an alternative model to patent law in case of AI systems generating
inventions).
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as employed creators or independent contractors allows the legal
system to control AI systems’ outcomes.
Fourth, instead of totally nullifying copyright laws as irrelevant
and outdated, the AI WMFH model amends and accommodates parts
of the existing doctrine. As a result, it better maintains legal and
social stability.
Fifth, imposing accountability on users will encourage the
careful operation of AI systems to avoid damages, infringements,
and counterfeiting of third parties’ rights. The model identifies
ownership as the main benefit of accountability. In this way, the
model ensures the AI systems do not get out of control.
The users can be firms, individuals, states, governmental
bodies, and more. The model is flexible. The accountability can be
changed according to the specific circumstances. For example,
damages caused by AI systems and actions or omissions of AI
systems can be causally linked to other stockholders.
Implementing the AI WMFH model will require new
legislation or adjusting the traditional laws, as current copyright laws
are insufficient to deal with the advanced technology revolution. The
model requires a fundamentally new component: recognition that
works generated by AI systems are copyrightable even though they
are not created by humans.
The United States is not the only nation to have considered the
effects that AI will have on copyright laws. Whereas U.S. law has
faced some impediments towards establishing copyright protection
for works created by AI, other countries have already taken
preemptive steps towards clarifying this issue. For example, the
United Kingdom took a stance with its 1988 Copyright, Designs, and
Patent Act.274 The Act declares that human authorship is irrelevant to
whether a work is copyrightable and that copyright in a work not
authored by a human lies with the person who is responsible for the
computer’s creation. 275 Around the same time, the European
Community considered the issue and applied an approach similar to
CONTU’s. According to the European Community, since computers
274. Robert C. Bird & Lucille M. Ponte, Protecting Moral Rights in the
United States and the United Kingdom: Challenges and Opportunities Under the
U.K.’s New Performances Regulations, 24 B.U. INT’L L.J. 213, 238 (2006); Miller,
supra note 54, at 1052 (arguing that existing case law contains no persuasive
objection to extending copyright protection to works crated without a human author
and that such an extension would fulfill the constitutional imperative of promoting
progress in these areas).
275. Miller, supra note 54, at 1052.
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are currently the tool of human authors, the default approach to
computer-generated works is to apply copyright protection.276
Although Europe had the added, thorny issue of moral rights, the
result was ultimately the same as that adopted in the United States.277
Recently, the European approach has shifted more toward
recognizing robots and AI systems as autonomous entities. One of
the best examples of this approach is the draft proposal to impose tax
payments on robots. 278 The World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) also discussed works produced by AI systems during the
drafting of a proposed model copyright law and ultimately adopted a
similar position as the European Community. 279 More recently,
Australian law has considered this issue in the context of deciding
whether or not a copyrightable work must have a human author. 280
Several Australian judgments seem to indicate that human authorship
is required. 281
V. U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW IS UNPREPARED TO DEAL WITH AI
SYSTEMS
A. Humans vs. AI Systems as Creators
The most significant hurdle to obtaining copyright control and
accountability for a work generated by an AI system is the principle
of human authorship. 282 It is not clear whether the U.S. Copyright
276. Id. at 1050.
277. Id. at 1049-50.
278. See Weller, supra note 122.
279. Michael L. Doane, TRIPS and International Intellectual Property in an
Age of Advancing Technology, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 465, 489, 497 (1994)
(arguing that the TRIPS Agreements, even without suggested improvements, “marks
significant progress in the quest for international intellectual property protection” by
“balancing the demands of the industrialized nations for international intellectual
property protection” and providing an “improved dispute resolution system with the
interest of developing countries in achieving an agreement on agricultural and textile
issues”).
280. Jani McCutcheon, The Vanishing Author in Computer-Generated
Works: A Critical Analysis of Recent Australian Case Law, 36 MELBOURNE U. L.
REV. 915, 938-40 (2012) (critiquing the application of conventional notions of
human authorship to modern productions and suggesting alternative approaches to
authorship that satisfy both the major objectives of copyright policy and the need to
adapt to the computer age).
281. Id. at 939-40.
282. MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01
(2008); see also Rebecca Haas, Twitter: New Challenges to Copyright Law in the
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Act itself explicitly requires the author of a creative work to be a
human. 283 However, the U.S. Copyright Office, by publishing “The
Compendium II of Copyright Practices,” has gone beyond the
statutory text to require that an author be human in order for the
work to be eligible for copyright protection.284 Although the
Compendium is an internal document without the force of law,285 it
reveals the attitudes of the Copyright Office and presents a
significant hurdle for humans seeking to claim copyright protection
in works not directly authored by them.
Consequently, integrating works produced by AI into the
copyright regime will require at least the disturbance of settled
Copyright Office practice. One must also determine whether that is
the only hurdle that exists. For example, proponents of giving
copyright protection to human users of AI-artists might look to
Urantia Foundation v. Maaherra for support. 286 In this Ninth Circuit
case regarding the copyright of a holy text supposedly authored by
“celestial beings,” the court mentioned, in dicta, that the Copyright
Act does not explicitly “require human authorship.” 287 However, the
case can also be interpreted as lending support for the idea that the
statute really does not protect works authored by non-humans. For
instance, the court muses, again in dicta, that “it is not creations of
divine beings that the copyright laws were intended to protect.” 288
Furthermore, the court required that “some element of human
creativity must have occurred in order for the Book to be
copyrightable.” 289 In that case, the court determined that the requisite
instance of human creativity was the compilation of the beings’
diverse revelations into a single volume. 290
The works of current-generation AI systems, like e-David, are
probably copyrightable because there is a connection between the
creative elements and the users, such as the feedback supplied by
Internet Age, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 231, 247-48 (2010); YaniskyRavid & Velez-Hernandez, supra note 32, at 19.
283. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990); Urantia Found. v. Maaherra, 114 F.3d 955,
958 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that copyright laws do not mandate humans to
author the work).
284. THE COMPENDIUM II OF COPYRIGHT PRACTICES § 202.02(b) (COPYRIGHT
OFFICE 1998).
285. Id. § 1902.07.
286. See Urantia Found., 114 F.3d at 957.
287. Id. at 958.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. See id.
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human trainers or the programming of a desired goal. But works
created by totally autonomous AI systems, like an advanced neural
network, probably do not meet the Maaherra standard, unless the
human in question were to somehow alter the works, such as by
compiling them together. Although that might be a sufficient remedy
for owners of creative AIs, it does not foreclose the possibility that a
single work, taken as it is, will not be copyrightable. To avoid this
outcome, I suggest the adoption of the WMFH doctrine for AI
systems, which considers the system to be the creative employee or
creative independent contractor, thus entitling the rights to another
entity to be responsible for the outcomes of the AI system.
B. Eligibility for Copyright Matters
Before determining the place artworks created by AI systems
should have in our copyright laws, it is important to explore what
place they presently occupy. Ultimately, all copyright protection in
the United States is derived from, or at least related to, the Copyright
Clause of the Constitution.291 The Copyright Act, which is Congress’
implementation of that constitutional grant of power, provides that
“[c]opyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression.” 292 The Supreme Court’s formulation is that “[t]o qualify
for copyright protection, a work must be original to the author” and
possess “at least some minimal degree of creativity.” 293
The creator of a traditional work of art receives copyright
protection automatically, as soon as the work is “put to paper.”294
New systems, like The Next Rembrandt, do not have a single
artist. 295 In such instances, the work itself was created by a digital,

291. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
292. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990) (stating that copyright protection exists for any
original works of authorship, in any tangible medium of expression, “from which
they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,” and lists several
categories of works of authorship, including literary works, musical works, and
dramatic works, among others).
293. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345, 363-64
(1991) (holding that information without original creativity is not protected by
copyright).
294. See § 102.
295. See Ann Bartow, Copyright and Creative Copying, 1 U. OTTAWA L. &
T. J. 75, 96 (2004) (arguing that in the US copying style is not generally considered
copyright infringement).
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rather than a human, creator. 296 Can the computer or the computer’s
owner assert a copyright?
To answer this question, one must apply the rules laid out in
the Copyright Act. One must first determine whether computergenerated art fulfills the basic requirements necessary to receive
copyright protection. 297 Copyright protection is currently available
for (1) an original work of authorship, (2) fixed in a tangible
medium, (3) that has a minimal amount of creativity. 298 If a work
does not meet all three of these requirements, then it is not
copyrightable subject matter. 299
1. Originality
An original work is one that is new or novel, and not a
reproduction, clone, forgery, or derivative work. 300 An original work
stands out because it was not copied from the work of others.301 In
another article, I have discussed the requirement of originality for
works generated by AI systems. 302 In that piece, I concluded that the
formal approach to originality is preferred to the subjective approach
and is applicable to works generated by AI systems. 303 For example,
at first glance, some may think that a work produced by The Next
Rembrandt is an original Rembrandt. However, the AI system
generated a new painting without copying any existing work even
though it did copy the style of the original painter. 304 Thus, as a
unique image, it is likely that a work produced by The Next
Rembrandt is an original work.

296. See SIMON STOKES, ART AND COPYRIGHT 7 (2012).
297. See § 102.
298. See id.
299. See id.
300. See id.
301. See id.
302. See Yanisky-Ravid & Velez-Hernandez, supra note 32, at 2.
303. See id. at 53-56.
304. See STOKES, supra note 296, at 6; Bartow, supra note 295, at 96
(arguing that in the U.S. copying style is not generally considered copyright
infringement).
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2. Fixed in a Tangible Medium
The second requirement for copyright protection is the notion
that an artwork must be “fixed in a tangible medium.” 305 This means
that the artwork must be more than just an idea in someone’s head. 306
To be copyrightable, the work must have a tangible physical
representation. Ideas are thus not copyrightable[;] only the execution or
expression of those ideas [are copyrightable], which usually occurs once
words are written on a page, paint is placed on a canvas, doodles [are]
drawn on a napkin, or even an image [is] captured by the digital sensor of
a camera or copied to a disk or cloud drive. 307

In this case, the work produced by The Next Rembrandt is a
physical painting, which is clearly a tangible medium, and thus it
satisfies the second requirement.
3. Creativity
Even if a human inventor or user is not foreclosed from
copyright ownership in the product of a creative AI system simply
because the author is not human, there is still another hurdle to jump.
The Supreme Court has ruled that, in order for copyright to apply to
a work, there must be “at least some minimal degree of creativity”
involved. 308 Conceptually, we have to ask if the “creativity” of an AI
system is really what the Supreme Court meant was required. It is
widely recognized that the standard of creativity is extremely low.309
In Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., the Second Circuit
held that “[a] copyist’s bad eyesight or defective musculature, or a
shock caused by a clap of thunder, may yield sufficiently
distinguishable variations.” 310 In the famous case of Feist
Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., the Supreme Court
made it clear that, although the standard of creativity is low, it is not
305. See Yanisky Ravid & Velez-Hernandez, supra note 32, at 12 n.38.
306. See id. (explaining that to satisfy the second requirement, the work
cannot just be “an idea in someone’s head”).
307. See id.
308. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345, 363-64
(1991) (holding that information without original creativity is not protected by
copyright).
309. See id. at 345.
310. 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951) (holding that in action for infringement
of copyright, the eight mezzotint engravings were sufficiently different from the
paintings which they purported to have copied and were thus entitled to copyright
protections).
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non-existent. 311 In that case, the Court found that a telephone
directory was not copyrightable because it was nothing more than a
compendium of facts, arranged in a commonsense way that revealed
no creative input on the part of the creators. 312 On cursory inspection,
Feist may not appear to square directly with Catalda. If Catalda
stands for the proposition that anything, no matter how miniscule or
inadvertent, that sets something apart from other works can supply
the requisite creativity, Feist seems to say that something more is
required. Although the phonebook was not identical to any other
existing work, it was still not subject to copyright protection due to a
lack of creativity. 313
Indeed, much critical scholarship has been devoted to the
proposition that Feist strengthened the creativity requirement. Prior
to Feist, the copyright standards appeared to require little more than
independent effort, and almost certainly did not require creativity. 314
Those scholars posit that Feist is a reformulation, and almost
certainly a tightening, of copyright restrictions. 315 Indeed, Congress
had earlier stated that the “standard of originality does not include
requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic [sic] merit, and there
is no intention to enlarge the standard of copyright protection to
require them.” 316 Furthermore, the Register of Copyrights had been
forced to abandon a standard that included a requirement that
copyrightable works “must represent an appreciable amount
of creative authorship.” 317 But the Feist Court nevertheless held that
their dual formulation of creativity and originality was
constitutionally mandated. 318 So, if creativity is logically distinct
311. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 345.
312. See id. at 362.
313. See id.
314. Howard B. Abrams, Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law, 55
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 44 (1992) (arguing that the principle demonstrated by
Feist is sound both doctrinally and in practice by “insisting that the constitutional
requirement of authorship embodied in the standard of originality have some
meaningful minimum”).
315. Id. at 5.
316. Id. at 15 (quoting HR 1476 at 51; S. REP. NO. 473 at 50).
317. See id. (quoting Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General
Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. 9 (Comm. Print, 1961)) (recommending that the statue should hold that works
must be tangible and “the product of original creative authorship” to be
copyrightable, and “that these requirements apply to new versions of preexisting
works”).
318. Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 347-48; cf. Abrams, supra note 314, at
14.
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from originality, then the mere fact that an AI system’s works may
be different from any that came before them will not be enough to
secure copyright protection, either for the machine itself or for the
owner of it. 319 A court would have to determine that some creativity
was involved in order for copyright to attach.320
It is difficult to pinpoint where exactly the element of creativity
lies within a work created by a machine. It is a somewhat easier
question with quasi-AI systems, like e-David, since the creators of
such systems need to directly program all of the machine’s
“creative” faculties. But with a hypothetical “learning” AI system,
like a neural network, any creative output would be the result of a
complex series of weights and calculations that human programmers
can neither create nor understand. While it is obvious that such
works can be “original,” in that they would not be identical to any
other works, it is uncertain whether the creativity requirement adds
anything more to the analysis. It may be that the process by which an
AI system creates an original work is not “creativity,” which, as a
term, has not been thoroughly explained by the Court. It may be that
the distinction the Court made in Feist is little more than an attempt
to prevent copyright from keeping compilations of plain facts out of
public dissemination simply because they are not exactly the same as
any other compilation. 321 But it may just as well be the case that the
creativity standard the Court articulated in Feist requires that innate,
hard-to-define aesthetic sensibility that is, particular to living
creatures. Such a definition of creativity presupposes an
understanding of the concepts that are the subjects of a work. Even
with advanced neural networks, it is difficult to foresee that such an
understanding within AI systems would be possible anytime soon.
Even if a machine could create a unique rendering of a subject, it is
very unlikely that AI system would understand what that subject is.
It thus lacks the type of internal comprehension that is generally
reflected in the works of a human artist when they try to represent
something more than the words on the page or the paint on the
canvas.
The conclusion is that advanced technology systems, such as
AI, which are capable of creating independent, creative, and original
works, render the existing copyright regime unworkable. I have
grounded the claim by discussing a few basic institutions within
319.
320.
321.

See Abrams, supra note 314, at 42.
See id.
See id. at 44.
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copyright discourse that cannot be applied in the same way to
machines as they can to humans. Based on this discussion, I have
concluded that current U.S. legal doctrine on the subject of copyright
for the works of AI is anything but clear. I have argued that there is
no settled law on the matter. Further support for the notion that
copyright should not subsist in works created by AI systems derives
from the analysis of the goals of copyright law and the way in which
the theoretical justifications for copyright protection interact with
works created by AI systems. Therefore, I support amending the
copyright laws and adding the tenth missing category—namely, the
WMFH model that sees AI systems as independent contractors or
employees and thus imposes ownership and accountability in regard
to the works on the human users of such machines.
CONCLUSION
As the pace of digital advanced technology continues to
accelerate and computers begin to achieve digital tools that I
formerly thought impossible, many fields are beginning to feel
pressure. For example, in the auto industry, once one of America’s
largest employers of factory workers, advanced robots are replacing
humans in more and more aspects of the production process. These
economic pressures are well known, but few have considered what
the effects of advanced computers may be on the arts. Creativity, at
least at the level necessary to produce works of authorship, is
considered to be a uniquely human attribute. But, more and more,
that presumption is being put to the test. Advanced AI systems like
the robot, Ava, in the movie Ex Machina are already challenging our
preconceived notions about the creative process itself. And this is
just the beginning. So far, copyright law exists as long as there is still
a human, or a team of humans, behind the art that these computers
produce. However, the reality has entirely changed as AI systems
have become able to create independently.
The technology has continued its forward march. Already,
computer scientists have conceived of a machine capable of learning
on its own and creating a work of authorship without a human
supplying all the creativity. Consequently, copyright law needs to be
changed or re-evaluated in order to determine how laws should
address these AI systems, the products they produce, and the
challenges they pose for the existing copyright regime. Policymakers
have to create new moral boundaries for these systems in order to
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avoid harm by imposing control of, and accountability for, AIgenerated works on recognized legal entities.322
The moment we understand how AI systems work, we realize
that copyright laws are unprepared and irrelevant for AI systems. AI
systems simply do not fit into the existing framework. In the United
States and Europe, the traditional solution has been to look for the
human behind the creative process, even when he or she does not
exist, but this solution is untenable in the long run.
United States law does not speak on this subject directly. But
certain legal doctrines exist that may act as impediments to granting
copyright protection to works authored by machines. Therefore, it
seems unlikely that the programmer, as one who has the rights to the
AI system but is removed from the creative process of the
independent, unpredictable AI system, will be responsible for the
works generated by the system. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a
work authored independently by a machine could be granted
copyright protection for itself, as such a result would leave humans
out of control and betray the justification on which the entire
copyright regime is based. It is still possible to change the legal
framework to accommodate these works, such as by implementing a
new AI WMFH model, as I have proposed. This model can solve the
accountability gap in regard to copyright law and even beyond the
intellectual property arena.

322. Isaac
Asimov’s
“Three
Laws
of
Robotics,”
AUBURN,
http://www.auburn.edu/~vestmon/robotics.html [https://perma.cc/J3RJ-JW8W] (last
visited Jan. 15, 2018) (stating the Third Rule of Robotics: “A robot must protect its
own existence”).

